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Abstract
Finite contracts, weak local forest law, and poor monitoring erode incentives for firms
to manage forests responsibly. In response, voluntary, independent certification of forest
management practices has emerged as a policy tool. If firms choose to participate, in return for
certified compliance with the standard they earn a price premium. Currently 9% of the world’s
production forests are certified by a credible voluntary standard, Forest Stewardship Council’s
Forest Management Certification (FSC). The effectiveness of voluntary environmental policies
remains poorly understood, particularly in the developing world. My dissertation examines
whether voluntary forest certification is effective at improving sustainable forest management.
I focus on FSC certification in Central Africa, home to a highly intact tropical forest second in
size only to the Amazon. In Central Africa, 66% of all forested land is gazetted for commercial
forestry.1 In three chapters, I evaluate FSC effectiveness by asking the following research
questions (chapter titles follow in italics):
1. Do FSC participants improve the environmental quality of their harvesting behavior?
Chapter 1: Gaming the Baseline: Certified Timber Production in Cameroon
2. Does the net effect of FSC activities improve development outcomes for locals?
Chapter 2: Unintended Impacts from Forest Certification: Evidence from Congolese
Households
3. Which forests participate in FSC and why? Do the highest priority forests participate?
Chapter 3: Drivers of Participation in Voluntary Forest Regulation and their Im-
plications for Conservation
1Nasi, R., B. Cassagne, et al. (2006). ”Forest management in Central Africa: where are we?” International
Forestry Review 8(1): 14-20.
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To answer these questions, I use multiple data sets and identification strategies. The data
range from primary data collected from Congolese households along a certified forest border
to a national panel of timber outcomes in Cameroon to a regional biogeographical dataset
spanning Gabon, Cameroon, and Congo.
Across the three chapters, I find FSC to be relatively ineffective due to three policy design
features: a relative standard for harvesting practices, process indicators for a multidimensional
standard, and voluntary selection into the policy.
FSC standards for harvesting practices are not the same for all forests. For each forest,
the auditor sets a management standard relative to that forest’s unique baseline manage-
ment practices. In Gaming the Baseline, my job market paper, I show that firms game this
design feature by distorting their production when the auditor establishes this baseline. At
certification, auditors document a change in harvesting practices, but on net, I do not find
evidence that harvesting practices become more sustainable. These empirical results fit the-
oretical predictions from a principal-agent model with asymmetric information between the
auditor and firm. Relative standards are not limited to forest management or FSC; consider
time-shifting of electricity usage or carbon additionality policies. During policy design, poli-
cymakers must account for strategic firm behavior and should remain skeptical of documented
change, however precisely measured.
FSC signals to consumers “responsible forestry,” a standard that encompasses sustainable
development for local forest users and protection of biodiversity, such as elephants and gorillas.
FSC relies on process indicators to assess whether firms address social and environmental needs
in their forest. Auditors can easily verify implementation of rural development activities, like
building a road, and environmental protection activities, like financing eco-guards to patrol
for poachers. The net effect on local forest users may be positive or negative, depending
on the activities and a forest user’s original endowment. Activities may also beget negative
x
externalities, like local deforestation. My second chapter, Unintended Impacts, evaluates how
FSC activities change forest dependent households’ consumption, production, and wealth.
The main FSC activities, a new road connection and controlled hunting protocols, result in
worse nutrition outcomes for certified households. Consumption of animal protein falls by one
third and indigenous households switch to an inferior starch source, in terms of calories, as
wild protein and farmed starch are exported. Farmer households both intensify and extensify
agricultural production. Extensification of fields comes from reduced fallow periods instead
of increased field clearing. Farmer households use their wealth to improve their dwellings.
This set of impacts reminds us that, when evaluating multidimensional policies, we should
expect to find tradeoffs across social and environmental goals; there will be winners and losers.
Policymakers must be prepared to explicitly prioritize among policy goals.
Finally, voluntary policies differ from traditional regulation in their reach: firms participate
only if doing so improves their profits. In the third chapter, Drivers of Participation, I
show that selection into legality and forest management certification depends on how each
policy increases costs, which varies across forests. Whether or not the most important forests
participate depends on how costs correlate with forest characteristics. In the case of FSC,
high conservation value forest was not more or less likely to select into the policy. In the
case of legality certification, I find that forests with higher production costs are more likely
to participate.
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CHAPTER 1
Gaming the Baseline:
Certified Timber Production in Cameroon
1 Abstract
Forestry firms lack incentives to leave trees behind to regenerate and replenish timber stock.
Firms can volunteer to adhere to a forest management standard defined by Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC) and invite an auditor to visit and verify their compliance. In return, they label
their timber as certified and receive a price premium. This paper asks, does certification
improve the environmental quality of participating firms’ harvesting practices? Using a panel
dataset of timber production for all Cameroonian firms, I exploit variation in event timing
and each species’ local regeneration risk to identify changes in harvesting practices. I find that
firms systematically distort production when the FSC auditor establishes their baseline. The
firm fells younger, smaller trees at the baseline for poorly regenerating species only; species
with the worst regeneration prospects see average tree size fall by 20 percentage points at the
baseline audit. On net, I find no evidence that certification improves firm harvesting practices.
2 Introduction
In Cameroon, the government leases one third of the forest to firms for industrial timber
production (Nasi et al., 2012). Once the lease ends, firms no longer have access to trees
within the forest. When prices are high, firms fell too many trees and risk local extinction
of commercial species. Knowing this, the Cameroonian government legally restricts access
to young trees to ensure regeneration. If enforced, firms would incur new costs from more
comprehensive inventories and additional roads as they leave behind profitable small trees and
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seek out large trees. However loopholes in forest legislation and weak monitoring make these
restrictions de facto unenforced (Vandenhaute and Doucet, 2006). Forest Stewardship Coun-
cil’s (FSC) voluntary forest management certification may resolve the challenge of exploiting
valuable timber in a way that sustains it for the future when local monitoring and enforcement
is weak. Independent auditors certify that participating firms comply with FSC’s standard.
Once certified, firms receive a price premium for their timber from consumers willing to pay
more for sustainably harvested timber.1
FSC is the largest and most credible sustainable forest management standard yet it remains
empirically untested.2 More generally, theoretical predictions for voluntary regulation’s effec-
tiveness are ambiguous when local monitoring is poor. The mechanism that drives changes in
firm behavior from voluntary regulation appears to be improved targeting of a local regulator’s
monitoring and enforcement resources (Blackman, 2010). Furthermore, FSC relies on third-
party auditors selected by firms to enforce harvesting restrictions. Yet auditors interested in
garnering future contracts have poor incentives to truthfully report firm compliance (Duflo et
al., 2013). In this paper, I investigate whether FSC certification improves the sustainability
of timber harvesting and explore the mechanisms that determine FSC’s effectiveness. I ask:
Do we see greater protection for species at risk of local extinction and if not, why not?
Drawing on the dynamic contracting literature, I build a principal-agent model between
auditors and firms to better understand FSC effectiveness and to frame my empirical results.
My model extends the theoretical voluntary policy literature by explicitly modeling asymmet-
ric information.3 In the FSC process, auditors make a baseline assessment, define harvesting
constraints relative to this baseline, and then certify compliance with harvesting constraints.
Auditors balance improving regeneration by restricting access to trees against maintaining
incentives for the firm to continue to participate in FSC. The menu of contracts they can
1Estimates of the price premium for FSC-certified timber range from 5-30%, with most estimates around
10-15%. (Kollert and Lagan, 2007)(Nebel et al., 2005)(Aguilar and Vlosky, 2007). This magnitude is similar
to the estimated price premium for Marine Stewardship Council’s certified seafood (Roheim et al., 2011).
2As of October 2014, FSC certified forests are found in seventy-nine countries (FSC, 2014).
3For early surveys of the theoretical framing of voluntary policy, see (Khanna, 2001), (Lyon and Maxwell,
2002), and (Alberini and Segerson, 2002). A separate but related literature on payment for ecosystem services,
a voluntary program, recognized the importance of modeling asymmetric information early in its development;
see, for example (Wu and Babcock, 1995). This literature has since moved toward conservation auctions as a
way to address the mechanism design problems inherent to voluntary policies (Ferraro, 2008).
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offer is limited by FSC’s price premium, determined exogenously in the marketplace. Under
a broad set of conditions, the model predicts that firms distort production at the baseline
assessment in order to weaken harvesting constraints. Based on the distorted baseline, the
firm’s opportunity cost from a harvesting constraint appears large to the auditor. At the
baseline, firms produce away from the profit-maximizing level, creating a second-order profit
loss, but gain a first-order increase in certified profits from the weaker constraint. Based on
the model, we predict that at the baseline firms will fell more of the trees the auditor wants
to protect: young trees of species at risk of local extinction.
Empirically, I investigate whether FSC improves harvesting practices by comparing pro-
duction at FSC events to production in the pre-event period. More specifically, I compare
changes at events for species at risk of extinction to changes for abundant species. To do this, I
create a new dataset that links the Cameroonian Forest Ministry’s production records to each
species’ local extinction risk. From 2003 to 2009, I observe all industrial forest production
in Cameroon, FSC participants and non-participants alike. Using a difference-in-differences
regression model, I investigate how each species’ felled size and quantity changes at certifi-
cation events. If certification improves the sustainability of harvesting practices, it should
restrict access to young, poorly regenerating tree species previously exploited. We would
expect at-risk tree size to increase once certified, a prediction I investigate using a triple
difference-in-differences model.
Instead, I find evidence that firms distort production at the auditor’s baseline assessment.
As dynamic contracting theory would predict, I find a large and significant decrease in tree
size in the baseline period for at-risk species only. On average, poorly regenerating species
tree size decreases by 7% in the baseline period. I also exploit variation in the intensity of
extinction risk among poorly regenerating species. Within each forest, some species have
very high extinction risk and any timber exploitation is unsustainable. For these species, the
question is not whether or not the auditor will constrain access to young trees, but by how
much. We expect these species’ incentives for distortion to be particularly strong and I find
a commensurate decrease in tree size, 21%, in the baseline period. I find no evidence that
FSC improves the sustainability of harvesting practices for species at risk of local extinction.
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Relative to production before FSC participation, tree size for at-risk species is unchanged at
certification. When considered from the auditor’s perspective, however, certified tree size for
high risk species appears improved relative to the baseline assessment.
I find further evidence that firms distort production in order to inflate their expected
cost of compliance. At the baseline, firms abruptly and temporarily increase the quantity
of trees felled for all species along extensive and intensive margins. Unlike costs related to
seeking out large trees, which depend on a species’ particular distribution of trees across space,
felling cost parameters are common across species. A firm can inflate the opportunity cost
of restrictions by making felling look less costly in general. For any species, the likelihood
that the firm fells at least one tree increases by 12% at the baseline audit. The firm fells 60%
more trees and total production for the forest increases by the same magnitude. Production
returns to the pre-event average immediately after the baseline audit. Total firm production
is unchanged in baseline audit years, suggesting that firms shift production across forests in
order to accommodate distortion. Consistent with a higher certified price, I do find a large
and significant increase in total firm production when certified: 36% more trees are felled in
certified years.
The regulation and dynamic contracting literatures have long predicted firms would be-
have strategically in order to game a regulator’s baseline (Weitzman, 1980; Laffont and Tirole,
1988, 1993). Empirical evidence is scant because reforms implementing incentive regulation
were often accompanied by other changes, such as broader deregulation (Joskow, 2013). We
do have empirical evidence of regulatory cycles, where public utilities make less effort to mini-
mize costs before rate adjustment hearings (Casarin, 2014; Joskow, 2013; Di Tella et al., 2008;
Bottasso and Conti, 2009). Given their empirical strategies, these papers document suggestive
correlation between changes in costs and regulatory events. My paper uses a different iden-
tification strategy –difference-in-differences– to show a causal change in firm behavior at the
regulator’s baseline. Moreover, the changes I estimate may be better characterized as “pure”
or “strategic waste,” as described by Sappington (1980). In rate cases, firms lack incentives
for cost minimization, whereas I find firms choose to incur additional costs now in order to
increase future profits.
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I contribute to the empirical voluntary policy evaluation literature in two ways. First, this
paper is among the first to credibly evaluate voluntary policy effectiveness with a very weak
local regulator. In developed countries, voluntary policies are most effective when they ac-
company mandatory regulation and strong monitoring and enforcement (Lyon and Maxwell,
2002). In developing countries, absent local compliance pressure, predictions about voluntary
policy effectiveness are ambiguous (Blackman, 2010). To date, empirical evidence primarily
comes transition economies with strong monitoring capacity relative to other developing coun-
tries (Rivera, 2002; Tambunlertchai et al., 2013; Foster and Gutierrez, 2013; Blackman et al.,
2010). According to Foster and Gutierrez, who study impacts on air pollution from Mexico’s
Clean Industry Program, the program improved air quality by acting as a signal for the local
regulator to more efficiently allocate scarce auditing resources. Second, this is the first study
to credibly evaluate voluntary policy effectiveness in forestry (Blackman and Rivera, 2011).
Forest certification has emerged as a global governance tool and FSC forest certification can
be considered emblematic of a trend toward non-state, market-driven governance (Cashore
et al., 2004; Earnhart et al., 2014). In contrast, most empirical evaluation of voluntary pol-
icy effectiveneses comes from toxics, ISO 14001, energy or air pollution policy and evaluates
policies that are locally circumscribed (Kim and Lyon, 2014; Gamper-rabindran and Finger,
2013; Delmas et al., 2010; Morgenstern and Pizer, 2007; Khanna and Damon, 1999; King and
Lenox, 2000).
The implications of this work extend beyond forest management to two areas of envi-
ronmental policy. First, we gain evidence that even if FSC auditors are corrupt, oversight
from a meta-auditor and public comment creates real pressure to report change from certifi-
cation. This finding differs from the pattern found among Indian auditors, who reported firm
compliance regardless of pollution emissions levels (Duflo et al., 2013). FSC ineffectiveness
appears driven by policy design features that encourage strategic behavior instead of auditor
rubber-stamping. Second, policymakers are experimenting with offsets in a variety of sectors,
such as time-shifting in electricity demand (“Nega-watts”) or carbon sequestration in avoided
deforestation. In these policies, participants are rewarded for reducing their electricity con-
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sumption or deforestation relative to a reference level.4 Scholars have expressed concern that
offsets fail additionality, e.g. they would have happened even without the policy intervention.
My work draws attention to a different problem with offsets, which must be measured relative
to a baseline: agents may behave strategically, manipulate the baseline and fail to make any
improvements at all.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section two describes the timber sector in
Cameroon, the FSC certification process, and how regeneration risk is calculated. The theoret-
ical model and its empirical predictions are section three. Section four describes the dataset,
section five the empirical framework. Results from the empirical analysis are presented in
section six. Section seven concludes.
3 Institutional Context
3.1 Timber Production in Cameroon
The second largest tropical forest in the world spans Central Africa. From Figure 1, we can
see the extent of the forest, much of which is earmarked for timber production. In Cameroon,
the government leases rights to selectively log timber sections of permanent forest domain,
primarily through auction. These contracts give firms the right to fell timber within the
boundaries of a forest management unit over thirty years.5 As of 2009, there were 89 forest
management units spanning six provinces, and the average forest management unit size was
about 72,000 hectares.
The number of active forest management units changes over the course of the panel due to
forest management units entering and exiting production. Beginning in 1999, the Cameroo-
nian government began auctioning rights to forest management units through a closed bid
4For example, in 2005 the City of Anaheim Public Utilities experimented with a billing schedule to address
excess electricity demand on hot days. Consumers were rebated 35 cents/KWh for the amount they reduced
their consumption during peak periods relative to their reference level consumption. See Wolak (2007) for
more on this experiment.
5Note that forest management units are not the only way firms may harvest timber in Cameroon. The
government also allocates Petits Titres and Sales Standing Volume for short-term, small-scale timber pro-
duction. Firms also trade timber locally amongst themselves. For now, I ignore these other forms of timber
procurement.
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process. With the exception of less than 10 forests, which were grandfathered into the current
system, all forests in the analysis were allocated through auction. Auctions occurred in 1999,
2001, 2002 and 2005.
Cameroonian forest management units harbor hundreds of different species of tree. Be-
tween 2003 and 2009, firms felled 147 different tree species. The set of commercial species
found in any one forest management unit varies from unit to unit, as does each species’ abun-
dance. The average number of species felled in a forest management unit in a year is about
22, with a standard deviation of 10.4 species. Natural forests harbor trees of different ages
classified by diameter measured at breast height (DBM) using ten centimeter bins. Across
all species, tree size ranges from saplings of a few centimeters wide to very old trees with a
diameter greater than 250 cm. Minimum exploitable tree size ranges depend on Cameroon’s
minimum diameter requirement for that species and, potentially, additional constraints re-
quired for sustainable management. In the 1994 Cameroon Forest Law the smallest minimum
harvesting diameter is 50 cm and the largest is 100 cm.
Multiple species and heterogeneous age distributions drive many of the positive external-
ities associated with natural forests. These features also complicate management. Greater
species and age diversity are associated with greater biodiversity and resilience to climate
change and other shocks. Variation in tree age makes each species’ population dynamics
more complex. Events in the past, like storms or felling, shape a tree species’ current local
distribution and its risk of local extinction. Current felling shapes a species’ future distribu-
tion. Forest management decisions are thus locally determined and vary across species and
across space. For this reason, I use a tree species within a forest management unit, e.g. a
forest-species pair, as the unit of analysis.
3.2 Forest Stewardship Council Certification in Cameroon
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) describes Forest Management Certification as a “voluntary,
market-based approach to improve forest practices worldwide.”6 Forest Stewardship Council is
a not-for-profit organization currently based in Bonn, Germany that is considered among the
6Source: https://us.fsc.org/our-history.180.htm Accessed October 25, 2014.
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most credible of eco-labels. The FSC Forest Management Standard was originally defined in
1994 and revised in 1996, 1999, and 2001, which is FSC International Standard Version 4. The
standard was revised in 2011 and in 2012 Version 5 was approved. Ten FSC Principles and
Criteria must be applied in any forest management unit for certification making the standard
multidimensional. The ten broad principles and criteria reach beyond forestry, writ small,
to include worker protections and rural development. My focus is narrow: I consider FSC
principles six, Environmental Impact, and seven, a forest’s Management Plan. Principle six
requires the firm to maintain or enhance “forest regeneration and succession,” among other
goals. Principle seven requires “rationale for rate of annual harvest and species selection” and
a plan for “the identification and protection of rare, threatened, and endangered species.”
If a firm chooses to participate, they select an FSC-approved auditor from a list on the
Accreditation Services International website.7 FSC-approved auditors are investigated by a
meta-auditor of sorts, Accreditation Services International, who confirms that “a certification
body is able to thoroughly assess clients . . . and issue certificates in an impartial manner.”8 I
observe two auditors in my dataset, Bureau Veritas and Rainforest Alliance, used by three and
two firms, respectively. Firms with multiple forests participating in FSC could use different
auditors across forests if they desired. In practice, I observe firms using the same auditor
for all of their participating forests. The role of the FSC auditor is really a hybrid between
regulator and auditor, as will become more clear in the discussion below of the FSC process.
This paper focuses on how firms change their felling at two events within the FSC regu-
latory process. This first event is the baseline event, when the auditor first visits the forest
and assesses the firm’s harvesting practices. At this moment the firm invites an FSC audi-
tor to visit their forest at their preferred date and time for a “pre-audit.” The firm pays for
the audit – salaries, per diem, materials, transportation, etc. – at a typical cost of around
$40,000-60,000. Following the visit, auditors share a list of “corrective actions” which the
7http://www.accreditation-services.com/archives/standards/fsc Accessed October 25, 2014
8http://www.accreditation-services.com/archives/what-is-the-difference-between-certification-and-
accreditation Accessed October 25, 2014
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firm must fix in order to become certified.9 Corrective actions are relative to the auditor’s
baseline, established at the pre-audit.
The second event in the FSC regulatory process is the certification event, when the firm
is awarded certification and can sell timber with the FSC logo. Firms take on average two to
three years to respond to the auditor’s corrective actions before inviting the auditor to return
for an “initial audit,” the certification event. During the initial audit, the auditor evaluates
the firm’s response to corrective actions. Soon thereafter, the auditor awards or denies FSC
certification. Once certified, the firm may sell their timber stamped with the FSC logo for the
next five years.10 About ten years pass between the baseline event and the expiration of the
FSC certificate. Most studies find an FSC price premium of 10-15% for exported timber (Nebel
et al., 2005)(Aguilar and Vlosky, 2007), though estimates for certified timber in Sarawak were
much higher (Kollert and Lagan, 2007). A price premium of 10-15% is similar in magnitude
to the estimated price premium for Marine Stewardship Council’s certified seafood (Roheim
et al., 2011).
Regeneration and succession refer to a species’ population dynamics. For some species,
FSC auditors are concerned that firms fell too many young trees, threatening the species’
regeneration and sustainable timber harvesting. FSC auditors use the ratio of future to
current trees to control current felling and ensure future felling. For managed species in
Cameroon, this ratio must be at least 50%: accounting for growth and mortality, the number
of trees available at the next timber harvest must be at least half of the number currently
available.11 Firms calculate the ratio by pairing a tree’s age distribution with a vector of
parameters, e.g. growth, mortality, and minimum felling age, in a simple population growth
model. FSC requires firms to increase the minimum felling age, proxied by diameter, until they
reach a ratio of future to current trees of 50%. If the FSC standard was a uniform standard,
9Unlike the initial audit, corrective actions from the pre-audit are private information between the firm
and auditor. They are only published if the firm continues on to certification. Initial audit results are always
published, even if a firm fails certification.
10Firms are periodically audited over the five year period, always at their own expense.
11A harvest rule that takes the oldest trees first is optimal when managing a forest to maximize biomass only,
not taking into account old-growth forest’s amenity value. When amenity value is considered, the harvesting
rate for older trees would be slower (See Amacher et al. (2009) pages 330-339 for more information). The 50%
harvesting rule comes from managing the forest for biomass, only.
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the harvesting constraint would be mechanical: the minimum felling diameter would increase
until the ratio between current and future trees was 50%. Instead, the standard is relative to
the firm’s opportunity cost from restricted access to trees. Auditors compare changes in the
harvest ratio against the firm’s opportunity cost from reduced access to small trees.
A special class of forest-species pairs brings the tradeoff between improved regeneration
and a firm’s opportunity cost into greater relief. Within some forests, past events shaped
a species’ local age distribution in such a way that even for the most stringent minimum
felling diameter the species fails the 50% future-to-current tree ratio. These forest-species
pairs have the “Worst Regeneration” among all species in any forest. Legally, firms continue
to exploit these trees by declaring them “unmanaged.”12 However, FSC requires all species to
be managed in order to satisfy principles six, enhancing regeneration, and seven, protection of
rare species. If the FSC standard was a uniform one, auditors would prohibit felling of these
species. Instead, FSC auditors increase the minimum felling diameter so that the harvest ratio
increases to at least 35%-40%. An example makes this concrete. In response to corrective
action 7.1.9 concerning the exploitation of some species where “renewal is not secured,” the
auditor writes that the proposed increases in harvesting diameter “represent a significant
sacrifice for the company, especially as regards Okan, which is a premium hydraulic wood”
(p. 80) (Veritas, 2013). The “sacrifice” here is the opportunity cost to the firm of no longer
felling smaller Okan trees. Notably, in this case the proposed diameter increase for Okan is
still insufficient to satisfy the 50% criteria.13
4 Theoretical Model
I use a two period principal-agent model of auditors and firms to describe FSC certification
in order to reveal firm incentives to distort production at the baseline event. The firm and
the FSC auditor maximize total discounted profit and utility, respectively. I make two initial
12According to Cameroonian law, at least 75% of a forest’s timber must be “managed,” which allows 25%
of a forest’s timber to be extracted at very high rates. The loophole is even bigger then it seems, because it
is assessed on potential timber resources, not those extracted. In practice, for uncertified forests the future to
current harvesting ratio requirement does not legally bind (Vandenhaute and Doucet, 2006).
13Acknowledging this, the auditor writes that the firm will focus on “increase[ing] the number of stalks in
phonological monitoring mechanisms and in the production of seedlings in tree nurseries.” (p 80)
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simplifications. First, I simplify the firm’s problem to a choice of average felled tree size.
I endow forests with a single species of tree that regenerates poorly. Second, I model the
auditor’s beliefs as naive. This set up reveals firm incentives to distort at the baseline.
I then enrich the model in two ways to generate more detailed empirical predictions.
First, I allow firms to choose a second input, tree quantity, which is an imperfect substitute
for average felled tree size. Second, I endow the forest with a second tree species with low
local extinction risk. Finally, I compare FSC’s relative standard to a uniform standard and
investigate how predictions change with different auditor frameworks.
4.1 Model Set Up
The timber firm and FSC auditor maximize total discounted profit and utility over two periods.
The firm manages a single forest endowed with a single tree species that has a high risk of
local extinction. Firms maximize profits by choosing the felled tree size zt given price pt and
their cost function. Costs are a function of a firm’s private parameter β drawn from the
distribution F (β), which is common knowledge. Auditors seek to maximize utility, which is a
function increasing in certified tree size.
4.2 Timber Firm Profit-Maximization Absent Certification
The firm’s forest harbors trees of a single species of different ages. The firm seeks out specific
trees for felling. Large trees offer more volume but firm incur additional costs in order to
access them, in the form of more comprehensive inventories and a denser road network. The
average tree size in period t, zt, reflects logging selectivity, which grows increasingly costly.
Firms differ in their tree search technology. The interaction of a firm’s technology and a
species’ local distribution determines search costs for that species. We can model the firm’s
problem, absent certification, using a quadratic search cost term.
max
zt
ptzt −
(
1
β
)
z2t (1)
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Search costs are scaled by a parameter β which reflects the interaction between the firm’s
technology and the species’ local distribution. Absent certification, the firm’s optimal tree
size and profit are linear in type and vary with price in period t:
z∗t =
pt
2
β pi∗t =
p2t
4
β (2)
Less productive firms have a low β, lower profits, and smaller optimal tree size because they
find search costly. Higher prices encourage search and increase profits.
4.3 FSC Auditor’s Utility Maximization Problem
The auditor’s utility strictly increases in certified tree size for species with high risk of ex-
tinction. This very simple representation of auditor utility has two distinctive features. First,
incentives to increase tree size are paid for by a direct transfer from consumers, not a gov-
ernment subsidy, eliminating the cost of raising revenue through distortionary taxes from the
auditor’s utility maximization problem. Second, the marginal benefits from increasing tree
size are linear and constant. When combined with the absence of costs, this implies that the
auditor will try to maximize tree size up to the maximum tree size possible.14
I model auditor beliefs as naive. Formally, naive beliefs imply that the auditor believes
that observed period one tree size, z1(p, β), is the firm’s profit-maximizing tree size, z
∗. Using
these beliefs and the firm’s optimal size z∗ = p
2
β, the auditor infers type from observed tree
size. This is possible because optimal tree size is linear in unobserved type. If the firm chooses
a first period tree size different from the optimum, the auditor will infer a different firm type
β˜, z1(p, β) = z
∗(p, β˜).
A compelling alternative would be a corrupt auditor. For corruption to fit the institutional
features of the FSC process, e.g. public auditor reports open to comment, the auditor must
document change between the baseline and certification and must do so in a way consistent
with reported production to the Forest Ministry. Later, I discuss a corrupt auditor trying to
14Another way to conceptualize the auditor’s problem is as a cost-effectiveness problem. Unlike benefit-cost
criteria, which would compare marginal benefits from increasing tree size to marginal costs, cost-effectiveness
aims to increase benefits as must as possible given a budget constraint.
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maximize the likelihood of a future contract given the need for documented change between
the baseline and certification. Predictions are consistent with those of a naive auditor.
Because participation is voluntary, the FSC auditor faces a constraint when maximizing
utility. The auditor chooses a certified tree size that satisfies the firm’s individual rationality
constraint. Firms only participate in FSC certification if certified profits exceed uncertified
profits: pi(zc|γp) ≥ pi(z2|p). Selecting a policy’s stringency conditional on firm participation
sets voluntary policies apart from traditional regulation. As pointed out in the voluntary
policy literature (Alberini and Segerson, 2002), the key difference between voluntary and and
mandatory policies is the regulator’s ability to force firms to incur unwanted costs, which
limits a voluntary policy’s scope.
Formally, we can write the auditor’s utility maximization problem as:
max
zc
zc
subject to
pi(zc|γp) ≥ pi(z2|p) (3)
The optimal certified tree size, given beliefs is a function of the price premium and linear in
observed type, making it linear in observed tree size: zc = Γz1, where Γ = γ +
√
γ2 − 1.
A graphical look at the auditor’s utility maximization problem makes two results concrete.
Given convex search costs, the profit function is concave. The solid line maps profit at uncer-
tified prices for different sizes of tree. The dashed line maps profit at certified prices. First,
note the FSC-certified price premium increases the profit-maximizing tree size, independent
of the auditor, to z∗2 > z
∗
1 . In this model, firms respond to an increase in price by seeking out
larger trees with greater volume. Later, in a richer model, firms will be able to respond by
felling more small trees.
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Second, with perfect information the auditor pushes the firm beyond the profit-maximizing
tree size given certified prices, z∗2 , to the largest tree size possible while maintaining firm
participation. This occurs where the firm is indifferent between certification and uncertified
production, zc2.
4.4 Game Timing
The forest certification process has three periods. Periods 1 and 2 are conditional on partici-
pating in the baseline audit. Recall that tree size is z and a firm’s marginal cost of increasing
tree size is scaled by the private firm parameter 1
β
. In the model, each firm manages one forest
and each forest has one species. Thus a ”firm” refers to a firm-forest-species triad.
• Period 0: State of Nature
– Firm draws its type β from F (β)
– Firm decides whether or not to participate in Baseline Audit
• Period 1: Baseline Audit
– Firm chooses tree size, z1 given p
– Auditor observes size, updates beliefs
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– Auditor chooses certified tree size constraint zc, offers contract {zc, pc}
– Firm accepts or rejects contract
• Period 2: Post-Baseline Audit Phase
– If accept and certify:
∗ Firm chooses profit-maximizing size z2 given pc and constraint zc
∗ Auditor verifies that tree size meets requirement, z2 ≥ zc
– If reject and abandon certification:
∗ Firm chooses unconstrained profit-maximizing tree size z2 given p
4.5 Firm Incentives to Distort
Suppose the firm maximizes total profit, the sum of profit in period one and discounted profit
in period two: Π = pi1 + δpi2. If the firm participates in certification, tree size choice in period
one affects second period tree size via the auditor’s tree size constraint rule. Firm total profit
maximization becomes:
max
z1,z2
pi(z1|β, p) + δpi(z2|β, γp) (4)
s.t. z2 ≥ zc = Γz1
Where Γ = γ +
√
γ2 − 1. Solving for the optimal distorted tree size, we get:
z1 =
(
1 + γ(δΓ)
1 + Γ(δΓ)
)
p
2
β (5)
Recall that z∗ = p
2
β. We can compare the distorted size to the optimal tree size given perfect
information. Since Γ > γ, distorted tree size is smaller than the optimal tree size, z1 < z
∗.
The auditor observes distorted and certified tree size, z1 and zc, where zc = Γz1. Harvesting
practices appear improved when comparing tree size across the two events, zc − z1. The firm
does not distort so much at the baseline such that the certified tree size is equal to the
unrestricted optimal tree size given a price of γp. The unconstrained optimal tree size is
linear in price; given the certified price premium, it would be z∗c =
γp
2
β < zc.
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What is the intuition behind the firm’s distortion? How far will it distort the baseline
size? The firm’s profit at the baseline from choosing tree size z1 = z
∗ + dz is:
pi1(z
∗ + dz) = pi∗ +
∂pi1
∂z
dz (6)
pi1 = pi
∗ + (p− z
∗
β
)dz (7)
Here, the firm is choosing a deviation around the optimal tree size z∗ = p
2
β. The second term
in the expression is zero at the optimum. Profit loss from distortion has a second order impact
only. Compare this to the gain in profit from a weaker constraint:
pic(zc + dz) = pic +
∂pic
∂z
dz (8)
pic = pic + (γp− zc
β
)dz (9)
We know that zc ≥ γp2 β, so the second term is positive and increasing in the change in tree size.
Distortion relaxes the constraint, making dz < 0, which has a first-order effect on certified
profits. The firm trades off between these competing effects from distortion, a second-order
loss in the baseline period and a first-order gain when certified, to find the optimal level of
distortion.
We can see how distortion works graphically. Like the previous figure, the firm’s uncertified
and certified profit given type β are the solid and dashed black lines, respectively. In grey are
the uncertified and certified profit for some type β˜ the auditor infers from observed z1, the
distorted tree size in period one.
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The figure shows how tree size changes at each event. At the baseline event, tree size falls
from z∗1 to z
D
1 . At certification, tree size increases to z
D
2 , which falls short of the unobserved
perfect information certified tree size, zC2 .
In addition to limiting policy scope, voluntary participation weakens the dynamic contract
in a surprising way. The firm’s outside option is its uncertified profit. When modeling dy-
namic contracting, the most basic construction has the outside option identical across types.
In this case, we would still predict that firms would distort at the baseline to relax the har-
vesting constraint (Laffont and Tirole, 1988). Here, the firm’s outside option is a function
of unobserved type. Distortion now relaxes the harvesting constraint along two pathways:
directly, by making search look costly, and indirectly, by making exit look more lucrative.
Consider another feature of FSC’s policy design limits effectiveness. The auditor can offer a
limited menu of contracts because the price premium is set exogenously in the marketplace. If
the market-clearing price is p, the certified price is pc = γp, where γ > 1 and fixed. Typically,
we would induce productive firms to expend effort using a menu of contracts. A fixed price
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precludes the use of a menu.
We can use this simple model to make some general predictions on FSC effectiveness. We
see that the larger the price premium, the larger the change in the certified tree size, even
with distortion. However, the marginal change in certified tree size given a marginal change
in the price premium is very small, because of distortion.
4.6 Comparison to a Static Contract
Suppose the FSC auditor used a static contract instead of a dynamic contract. How would this
change effectiveness? A static contract would mean a uniform forestry standard; the auditor
could not tailor the contract requirements to the firm. In this case, the auditor would choose
certified tree size based on the least efficient firm that would satisfy the auditor’s criteria, β
within the distribution of search costs, F (β). The certified tree size would be Γz∗1(β) Given
the price premium γ, firms would either accept or reject the contract. All firms at least as
productive as β would choose to participate. All types β ∈ [β, βˆ) would expend some effort
when certified, meaning their certified tree size would be greater than the profit-maximizing
tree size given the certified price: zc >
γp
2
β. The type at which the constrained tree size is
equal to thee profit-maximizing tree size given the price premium is the threshold type βˆ.
More productive search types will increase their tree size beyond the criteria, but only up to
their profit-maximizing level.
We can compare this to the naive auditor prediction, which has all firms increasing tree size
beyond their profit-maximizing level in the second period. Which policy dominates depends
on the distribution of types, F (β). If types are very heterogeneous, the dynamic contract will
outperform the static contract.
4.7 Enriching the Model
4.7.1 Tree Quantity and Tree Size: Imperfect Substitutes
The previous model simplified firm choice to just tree size but we know that firms choose
both tree size and the quantity of trees to fell. We can think of tree quantity and tree size
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input choices as imperfect substitutes when producing timber volume, V = qz, to sell on the
open market. The quantity of trees felled changes the cost function in two ways. First, we
introduce a convex felling cost, 1
φ
q2, which reflects the labor and material cost of felling a tree.
These costs are independent of search costs. Second, we scale search costs by the number of
trees felled, making search costs now 1
β
qz2.
How does the FSC auditor’s problem change with the firm’s enriched production function?
The auditor’s utility function is unchanged and remains a function of tree size only; changes
are restricted to the auditor’s information set. Suppose the felling cost parameter φ is private
information to the firm and the auditor knows only the distribution, G(φ).15 We enrich
auditor beliefs to be naive but consistent. The auditor still believes observed production is
profit-maximizing for both parameters, e.g. z∗ = z1, q∗ = q1. The auditor still controls second
period tree size via the contract, z2 ≥ zc. Consistency refers to the auditor’s beliefs about the
new felling parameter. The firm must maintain the auditor’s expected felling cost parameter
across the baseline and certified periods, φ(q∗) = φ(q2). Otherwise, the auditor concludes the
firm has distorted production and refuses to grant certification.
The auditor’s problem becomes:
max
zc
zc
subject to
pi(zc|γp) ≥ pi(z2|p) (10)
φ(q∗) = φ(qc) (11)
The auditor’s constraint assignment rule remains the same as before, zc = Γz1, however
the firm’s total profit-maximization problem changes.
max
z1,z2,q1,q2
Π = q1(pz1 − q1
φ
− z
2
1
β
) + δq2(γpz2 − q2
φ
− z
2
2
β
)
15We can imagine an alternative scenario. Suppose the auditor’s information set is unchanged from the
single input scenario, namely only β is private information to the firm. In this case, the auditor is empowered
by the second input because the auditor can use optimal quantity q∗ to triangulate the search cost parameter.
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subject to
z2 = Γz1 (12)
q2 = q
∗
2(q1) (13)
If we re-write the profit-maximization problem in terms of type, the firm chooses the types it
would like to mimic, {β˜, φ˜} given the auditor’s beliefs, which determines {z1, q1, z2, q2}.
As before, the firm always distorts the search cost parameter to make seeking out large
trees appear more costly, β˜ < β. If the firm distorts the felling cost parameter, it will make
felling appear less costly, φ˜ > φ. The intuition is that the firm now has two margins along
which it can distort the expected opportunity cost of the harvesting constraint. Distorting
tree size around the optimum always pay off because the gain in certified profit outweighs the
second-order profit loss in the baseline period. Quantity is unregulated, so the firm will only
distort the auditor’s expected felling cost parameter in order to relax the tree size constraint.
A cheaper felling cost parameter implies a greater opportunity cost from restricted access to
small trees. But whether the firm deflates expected felling cost depends on the relative cost of
distorting quantity versus tree size. If felling costs are low relative to search, the firm will find
it profitable to distort along both margins, decreasing tree size and increasing tree quantity
in the baseline period.
In the case where the firm chooses to make felling appear cheaper, φ˜ > φ, the extra margin
for distortion makes the difference between the optimal and distorted tree size worse than in
the previous model without quantity, e.g. z1 < z
q
1, which in turn weakens the certified tree size,
zc << z
q
c . Distorted felling brings with it costs in the second period - the firm must maintain
the expected felling cost parameter - but the gains from more revenue in the baseline period
and a weaker certified tree size dominate.
We can summarize model predictions for observed outcomes. With the richer model, we
expect that felling increases at the baseline, q1 > q
∗. We still expect to see smaller tree size
at the baseline, z1 < z
∗. Tree size and quantity both should weakly increase at certification,
from the price premium and the constraint, zc > z
∗, qc > q∗.
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4.7.2 Mix of Safe and At-Risk Tree Species
We can enrich the model further to describe a forest with two tree species, one which regen-
erates poorly P and one that is abundant A. Keeping our focus on the role of information
asymmetries, suppose production costs are independent across the two species but they share
the same felling cost parameter, φ. Their search cost parameters differ, βP 6= βA, because
search is determined by each species underlying distribution. The auditor’s utility function
remains a function of the poorly regenerating species tree size, zP , only. Like in the previous
case, we broaden auditor beliefs to include consistency across species: φ(qP ) = φ(qA).
In this case, the direction of our predictions for the poorly regenerating species do not
change: the firm continues to distort tree size and tree quantity. How does the firm change
production outcomes for the abundant species? For the firm’s joint profit-maximization prob-
lem, the linkage between the species is the auditor’s expectations of the felling cost parameter.
We know from the previous section that if the firm distorts the felling cost parameter, it will
make felling look cheap in the one-species case. Thus, given our consistency requirement, the
firm will also make felling look cheap for the abundant species. Any changes in tree size for
the abundant species are marginal and occur only in response to the change in quantity. Our
predictions for the abundant species would be an increase in production of similar magnitude
to the poorly regenerating species, and a very weak decrease in tree size.
An extreme example makes predictions for the abundant species more concrete. Consider
the case where the abundant species price is low enough that, absent certification, the firm
does not find it profitable to cut any abundant species trees. In order to distort the felling
cost parameter, the firm would now cut abundant species trees, a change along the extensive
margin.
4.8 Model Extensions: Auditor Beliefs and Utility Maximization
Problem
So far, the FSC auditor has been modeled as naive or naive and consistent. These beliefs,
while restrictive, are a simple way to investigate whether and how the revelation principle
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fails. They may also be more appropriate given the context, where instead of a government
regulator we have a well-intentioned NGO. But how robust are model predictions to other
ways of framing the principal-agent problem? Here I discuss how predictions change for three
of the most likely alternatives: a constrained auditor, a corrupt auditor, and a sophisticated
auditor.
As discussed in the institutions section, the FSC auditor is periodically audited by a meta-
auditor. We can re-frame the FSC auditor as not naive but constrained, working within a
nested principal-agent contract with the meta-auditor. In order to satisfy the meta-auditor’s
contract, the FSC auditor must show that tree size changes between the baseline and certi-
fication. The FSC auditor’s utility function changes from U = zc to U = f(zc − z1), where
f ′ > 0. Now the meta-auditor’s beliefs constrain the firm. If the meta-auditor is naive, which
may be a more realistic assumption, the FSC auditor’ problem collapses to the naive auditor
case.
Instead of a naive or constrained auditor, we can imagine a corrupt FSC auditor. We can
imagine two broad forms of auditor corruption: cheap talk or in cahoots. For the former, au-
ditors would always report that the firm satisfies FSC criteria at the baseline and certification
audits and we would predict no change in harvesting practices at either event.16 This frame-
work fits the FSC process poorly because audit reports are open to public comment, auditors
are themselves audited by an accreditation service, and we observe a change in felled tree
size between the baseline and certification events using independent Ministry data. A more
nuanced model would have auditors reporting changes in harvesting practices in audit reports
while firm harvesting remains unchanged. This would require reporting felling that differs
from that recorded by the Ministry and is unlikely given that the Ministry also comments on
FSC audit reports.
Instead, suppose the auditor creates a side contract with the firm to manipulate the public
comment process. The contract specifies a change in harvesting at the baseline. The auditor
would like to maximize the likelihood of a future contract with the firm but is constrained
by the risk of being detected as corrupt. The higher the firm’s total profits, the more likely
16This framework explains empirical evidence from auditors in India, for example (Duflo et al., 2013).
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the FSC auditor will gain a future contract. Auditor utility is thus a function of firm profits,
U(Π). The risk of detection increases as the documented change from certification falls:
Pr(D) = g(zc − z1), where g′ < 0. In this set up, the auditor’s utility maximization problem
is a transformed version of the firm’s total profit-maximization problem with a naive auditor.
We would predict similar incentives to distort tree size at the baseline.
Finally, I briefly consider a sophisticated FSC auditor, a framework that merits future
work. The auditor is aware of firm incentives to distort tree size at the baseline. Using a
proof structure based on Laffont and Tirole (1988), we can show that if types are continuous
a fully separating equilibrium is impossible. Like in the case of the naive auditor, I use the
envelope theorem to show that the firm always has an incentive to deviate in the baseline
and mimic a less efficient type, the “ratchet” effect described by Weitzman (1980). This is
conditional on the auditor having a minimum standard, a threshold type below which firms
cannot be certified. Around the optimum, the firm will always trade a second-order loss in
marginal revenue in the baseline period for a first-order gain in avoided search costs from
a relaxed constraint in the certified period. It is worth noting that in this case, a static
contract outperforms the dynamic contract because both have a uniform standard but the
static contract avoids first period distortion.
5 Data
5.1 Forest Production Data from the Cameroonian Forest Ministry
In Yaounde´, Cameroon in 2012, the Director General of the Cameroonian Ministry of Forestry
agreed to share Ministry data with me with the explicit goal of analyzing how Forest Steward-
ship Council certification changes forest production in Cameroon. The Ministry shared pro-
duction data for all forest concessions active between 2003 and 2009. The Ministry of Forestry
compiles forest production data in their Syste`me Informatique de Gestion de l’Information
Forestie`re (SIGIF). The SIGIF houses production data collected from DF-10 forms strictly
controlled by the Ministry. From 2000-2005, the government contracted with Global Witness,
a non-governmental organization, to serve as an independent forest monitor. From 2005 to
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2009 the NGO Resources Extraction Monitoring took over forest monitoring. Although forest
monitoring is broader than ensuring SIGIF’s data integrity, both NGOs did include comparing
DF-10 forms to site records, among other activities.
For each year t, in the SIGIF dataset I observe an owner identity g, the number of trees
cut Sgfst and the total volume harvested Vgfst, in meters cubed, for tree species s in forest
management unit f .17 Summary statistics are reported in Table 1. Between 2003 and 2009, I
observe non-zero trees felled for 9,215 forest-species pairs in the SIGIF dataset.18 The SIGIF
reporting process changed in 2003 from a June-July year to a January-December year. Total
production for 2003 appears low in Figure 2 for two reasons: it captures half a calendar year
of timber harvesting and only 70 forests were active. When a firm does not fell trees, there
is no record on the DF-10 form. I infer zero production for missing forest-species pairs that
are observed at least once between 2003 and 2009. Table 2 gives a sense of patterns along
the extensive margin. We see zero production increase sharply in 2009 in response to the
global recession. Another sharp jump occurs in 2006, likely reflecting newly awarded forest
management units’ slow start. Table 2 shows 9,215 observations non-zero of forest-species
pairs and 8,915 inferred zero production observations, for a total of 18,130 observations.
In order to estimate fixed effects for each forest-species unit, I drop forest-species pairs only
observed once. I also drop 18 observations with average size less than 1.5 meters cubed and
9 observations with average size greater than 50 meters cubed. Using the generic allometric
equation for trees in Cameroon, a tree with 1.5 meters cubed would have a diameter of
about 40 cm; the smallest legal diameter is 50 cm. Together, this restriction results in 7,986
observations.19 Figures 3 and 4 show each outcome variable’s distribution using the restricted
population. The large spike in the quantity graph comes from the number of forest-species
pairs with a single tree reported cut. For some specifications I include a forest-level trend,
which requires a third observation per forest-species pair, resulting in 6,642 observations total.
17Forest certification events occur at the forest management unit level. A forest concession may be made
up of more than one forest management units.
18Among the non-zero observations, 139 reported positive volume but were missing the number of trees cut.
The volumes harvested are very small, much smaller than the amount generated by one tree. I suspect the
missing values occur because firms reported a fraction of a tree cut and the report format used by the Ministry
when sharing the data did not support non-integers.
19All results are robust to including these 27 observations.
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Between 2003 and 2009, 89 distinct forest management units f actively harvested timber
for at least one year. Of the 89 forest management units, 11 change ownership over the
period, for a total of 98 forest-firm pairs gf . In the empirical analysis, when a forest changes
ownership I treat each firm-forest pair as independent forests. In effect, I create a new index f
that corresponds to a firm-forest pair gf 20 Among the 98 forest-firm pairs, 85 have at least two
years of positive production, making the effective number of clusters 85 for regressions with
fixed effects. Table 3 shows the breakdown of firms and forests by participation status. Units
listed under “Baseline” experienced at least a pre-audit, the baseline event, between 2003 and
2009. Of 33 firms, five participate in forest certification. These five firms enroll 19 forests in
at least the baseline event. Participating firms manage a portfolio of forest management units
that includes both certified and uncertified forests. Figure 5 shows variation in participation
across Cameroon. Not shown is firm variation across space; firms tend to concentrate in one
or two regions.
For each forest, I observe quantity of timber harvested by species. The dataset includes
147 unique species; the average forest management unit reports positive production for 34.7
(SD 15.2) unique species. The analysis relies on change across years within a species-forest
unit. There are a total of 3,353 forest-species units. Table 4 imposes panel and size threshold
requirements and we are left with 2,136 forest-species pairs remaining, which is the number of
estimated fixed effects. I construct two variables to assess changes in quantity of trees felled.
First, I use the natural log of trees felled, qfst = ln(Qfst). Production levels vary greatly: the
median number of trees felled across all forest-species units is 15 trees felled, while the mean
is 96.9 trees felled. Much of this variation comes from different levels across species because
some tree species are more abundant than others. For example, the average number of trees
felled for Acajou de Bassam (Khaya ivorensis) is 29 trees, whereas the average for Ayous
(Triplochyton scleroxylon) is 710 trees. Because my empirical framework uses changes within
a forest-species unit at forest certification events in order to identify firm distortion, using
trees felled in levels may mute or overstate group-level changes at certification events. The
second variable I construct is a binary variable, 1[qfst > 0] equal to one if I observe non-zero
20There is one case where the SIGIF has entries for the former and new owner in the same period. Obser-
vations from both units were retained for the analysis.
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number of trees felled.
Next, I construct three measures of a forest-species’ average tree size. To calculate the
unit’s gross average tree size, I divide the total volume felled by the total number of trees cut,
Afst = Vfst/Sfst. Next, I use an allometric equation estimated in Cameroon that relates tree
diameter to tree volume. I invert the allometric equation, using the average tree size, to find
the equivalent diameter, Dfst. Finally, I create a diameter gap measure to reflect the distance
between the average tree diameter and the minimum felling diameter, which varies by species:
DGfst = Dfst −Dmins .
As noted in the institutions section, timber auctions occur during the panel, changing the
number of active forests. Table 2 shows a large jump in the number of forests from 2005 to
2006, from 72 to 85, reflecting an auction in 2005. Trends across the panel change in 2005,
perhaps in response to this auction. In Figure 6, we see average tree size increase slightly after
2006 across all size percentiles except the lowest percentile. Table 6 shows the annual average
number of trees felled per forest-species pair, log-transformed. The overall average is 2.755,
which is 12.8 trees. The average number of trees felled falls across the sample. In Figure 2 we
see total sector production is highest in 2006, passing 1.8 million meters cubed. To summarize,
we see a general trend of fewer, larger trees felled on average. I will use different regression
specifications with a species time trend to as a check on whether changes at events are driven
by this broader trend in tree size.
5.2 Forest Management: Ownership, Event Timeline, and Forest
Characteristics
Forest management data was paired with production statistics. I coded information on sub-
contracting arrangements and forest certification event dates from three main sources. Several
timber corporations in Central Africa are composed of multiple smaller firms and joint ven-
tures with different names. This makes it difficult to link subcontractors to the firm exploiting
timber or to link joint-ventures to their parent corporation. For each forest management unit,
the SIGIF database identified the permit-holder, not the corporation. I used World Resources
Institute’s Global Forest Watch Forest Atlas for Cameroon (2012) to link permit-holders to
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subcontractors and to match smaller firms to their parent corporations.21
To identify the 18 forests that participated in a baseline audit between 2003 and 2009, I
used the Forest Stewardship Council Certification’s online database.22 Variation in baseline
event timing is shown in Figure 7. From the database, I accessed public audit reports published
by FSC auditors for the 15 forests that elected to continue the certification process, nine of
which certify before 2010. Certified forests per year are plotted in Figure 8, where we see nine
forests certified in 2009. I was able to establish baseline audit timing for the three forests that
drop out of certification using either documentation from certified forests or the company’s
website.23 From each audit report, I coded the month and year of the auditor’s first visit to
the forest and the timing of the certification event. For the certification dummy variable, I
use the year the forest is certified and able to sell timber with the FSC label, not the year of
the initial audit.24 Likewise, some forests scheduled a second “pre-audit” before certification.
The timing of the second pre-audit event often occurred very close to the certification audit.
Second pre-audits are not included in the analysis.
One forest has an unusual history with FSC that deserves mention. After certifying in
2007, the auditor stripped the forest of FSC certification between 2007 and 2008. The auditor
restored FSC certification in 2009, which explains the gap in certified forest in 2008 in Figure
8. Results in the empirical analysis are robust with or without this forest.
21From the SIGIF database, I do not officially observe entry and exit. I only see positive production for
a firm-forest pair. The Center for International Forestry (CIFOR) shared information on changes in forest
ownership over time. This data enabled coding of shut-down years at the end of the panel which would
otherwise looked like exit. It also served as a check on the SIGIF and WRI databases for linkages across firms
and firm-forest linkages. Note that the regression analysis does not include shut-down years.
22Info.fsc.org: Accessed in 2011 and again in 2014.
23It is ambiguous whether forest management unit 10-040 had a baseline audit in 2009. I do not include FMU
10-040 among the 18 participants for three reasons. First, SIGIF reports production by the uncertified owner
in 2008 and 2009. Second, the firm’s public audit report does not discuss corrective actions or forest history
for 10-040. Third, I lack a management plan for 10-040 and could not code local regeneration risk. Estimates
from difference-in-difference specifications, which do not require local risk, are unchanged by including 2009
as an audit year for FMU 10-040.
24A few times the initial audit occurred at the end of the year and certification was awarded the following
year.
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5.3 Regeneration Risk Data
The Cameroonian Forest Ministry shared with me all forest management plans they received
until about 2010. Legally, the forest management plan must include a table de peuplement, a
table with the estimated number of individual trees in the forest management unit for each 10
cm diameter class between 20 cm and 150 cm, inclusive. Estimated tree counts come from a
coarse, large-scale inventory across 1-3% of the total surface of the forest management unit, a
process detailed in Arreˆte´ 222. For all forests that participated in the baseline event, I coded
tree counts for all species and all diameter classes.25 To construct the “At-Risk” or “Poor
Regeneration” flag, I paired the management plan table de peuplement with each species’
growth rate and minimum diameter. I use Arreˆte´ 222 of May 24, 2001 from the Ministry of
Environment and Forestry for these species parameters. The Arreˆte´ lists which species must
be managed, their legal minimum harvesting diameter, and their average annual diameter
growth rate in millimeters. Minimum diameters vary between 40 and 100 cm, growth rates
between 0.35 to 0.9 mm/year. Mortality rates are assumed 1%, assessed annually, and a one-
time 7% loss captures tree damage during felling. I then wrote an algorithm that replicates
the simple population model used by the Ministry and FSC auditors to calculate the harvest
ratio at different minimum diameter thresholds. The algorithm simulates population dynamics
at different minimum diameter thresholds. Forest-species pairs failing the 50% recruitment
rate threshold for any minimum felling diameter were tagged as “Worst Regeneration.” Table
7 reports variation among FSC participants in regeneration classification for the seventeen
species classified at least once as having the worst regeneration.
6 Empirical Strategy
My research question seeks to identify whether participants in FSC improve their harvesting
behavior once certified. If not, I wish to investigate whether strategic distortion of the audi-
tor’s baseline can explain this failure. Normally, random assignment of FSC would serve as
25Some management plans reported densities instead of counts. In these cases, I converted the density to a
count using total forest area. Some forests updated their management plan after certification and included a
new Table de Peuplement. In these cases, I used the Table from the first management plan.
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an empirical benchmark. However, I am interested in policy effectiveness given endogenous
selection by firms into the voluntary policy. My goal is to estimate harvesting changes at
certification events conditional on participating in FSC.
One approach would be to explicitly control for endogenous treatment status using pre-
dicted participation. However, Doremus (2014) found that, with the exception of forest size,
observable characteristics did not consistently predict FSC participation. Instead, I make
an identifying assumption that unobserved trends are the same for participants and non-
participants and use a difference-in-differences framework to identify deviations at FSC events.
By including fixed effects at the forest-level, I estimate deviations from within-unit averages
and accommodate changes in the composition of treated and control units over time. For
outcomes for forest-firm f in province p in year t, the basic regression specification is (14):
yfpt = βBLBaselineft + βIntInterimft + βCertCertifiedft
+ βDropDropoutft + αf + ρpt + fpt (14)
Where yfpt is a production outcome, either a measure of tree quantity or size. Forest fixed
effects αf control for forest-specific effects and province-year fixed effects ρpt control for omitted
variables which might be correlated with FSC that are shared among forests in each of the
five provinces in a given year. For example, if a major road linking a province to the port
is resurfaced, transport costs would fall for forests in that province. Likewise, production
outcome reporting is controlled by region, so measurement error likely varies by province. My
identifying assumption is that, absent FSC, non-participating and participating forests have
parallel trends. The error term fpt is clustered by firm-forest pair and there are eighty-five
clusters after imposing size thresholds and panel requirements.
The reference period includes all observed years before the baseline audit.26 The dummy
Baselineft is equal to one during the first baseline audit. Unlike the baseline event, a forest
26The length of the reference period varies across participants. The longest reference period is six years,
the shortest is zero years. In this case, the forest has a baseline audit the first year I observe it in the
Ministry’s production database. I include this forest in all regressions to help identify changes at certification.
Eliminating it improves the precision of the baseline coefficient estimate but does not appreciably change the
magnitude.
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certification “event” may occur more than once within the panel if the forest is certified for
multiple years. The treatment variable denoting forest certification, Certifiedft, is a dummy
variable equal to one each year the forest can sell timber labeled FSC. For example, if a
forest certifies in December 2008 and is active in 2009, all species within that forest will have
Certifiedft equal to one in 2008 and again in 2009. Years between the first baseline audit
and certification are lumped into the Interimft period.
27 For forests that drop out of the
certification process, years after the baseline audit are tagged with Dropoutft equal to one.
6.1 Event Changes Common to All Species Within the Forest
Certification events are common to all species felled in that forest. Estimation of (14) is
straightforward for outcomes we can meaningfully aggregate across species, such as the number
of trees felled in a forest. However, other outcomes, like average tree size and changes along
the extensive margin, are better evaluated for each species within a forest. Since we identify
FSC event coefficients using changes across time, individual data improves precision if we
control for additional time-varying omitted variables. Species-year fixed effects, γst, control
for year-specific omitted variables shared across species, such as demand shocks. In addition
to adding species-year fixed effects and clustering the standard errors, I add a species-forest
pair’s fixed effects to (14). My identifying assumption is similar to before. I use cluster-robust
standard errors grouped at the firm-forest level, which requires the weaker assumption that
shocks are independent across clusters as well as addresses serial correlation in the error term.
6.2 Identifying Assumptions
In order to estimate causal changes in forest production at FSC events common across species,
I make two assumptions necessary for identification in any difference-in-differences regression
model: I assume that participating and non-participating forests share common unobserved
time trends and that the change from certification is additive and constant across participants.
27The length of the interim period varies across forests. For the forest stripped of FSC certification in 2008,
this year was coded as ”interim.” Regression results are robust to dropping this special forest: magnitudes
and directions stay about the same and precision improves on the baseline coefficient estimate.
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Here, I investigate the two most likely violations of the common trends assumption: different
trends at the firm level and different trends at the forest level.
Variation in baseline event timing and heterogeneity in non-participating firm type address
potential concerns over different trends for participating and non-participating firms. The
timing of the baseline event varies across years and firms, as shown in Figure 7. Baseline
events occur as early as 2004 and as late as 2009. During the period of inquiry, we observe
foreign-owned firms increasing the number of forests they manage. All FSC participants are
foreign-owned, thus we might be concerned that unobserved, broad sectoral changes that
vary with ownership status drive changes across time. However, foreign-owned firms are
found among non-participants, including the largest timber producer in Cameroon. Finally,
participating firms have portfolios that include non-participating forests.
We might be concerned that participating forests have different unobserved trends than
non-participants. Two violations seem plausible: a shock that drives FSC participation and
anticipatory behavior by participants. For the former, any shock that drives participation in
the baseline audit should be persistent because FSC certification is a ten year process; if firms
are rational, temporary changes in demand or productivity should not drive participation
in FSC. A persistent change is incompatible with our theoretical prediction, a temporary,
discontinuous change in production. To look for persistence, I investigate how unregulated
outcomes, like tree quantity, change after the baseline event.
Two types of anticipatory behavior would violate the common trends assumption: antici-
patory demand for “greener” timber and firms responding to future constraints. Anticipatory
demand for “greener” timber, if it existed, would be forest-specific and persistent; firms would
use their public baseline audit in a way similar to the FSC logo to signal their movement
toward sustainable timber production and attract additional orders. This change would per-
sist into the interim period and thus is incompatible with the model’s predicted temporary
distortion. Institutions make raiding and stockpiling trees in anticipation of future constraints
unlikely. The only reason to raid and stockpile trees is if participating in the baseline event
changed access to these trees as compared to the pre-event period. By Cameroonian law,
every year firms are restricted to felling within a demarcated zone. At the end of the year,
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they move on to the next zone. Incentives to raid that year’s zone, which are few considering
stockpiling logs is costly and strongly discouraged by the Ministry, are unchanged by the
baseline event. Moreover, the FSC auditor regulates tree size, not the quantity of trees.
I investigate these potential violations in three ways. First, I investigate alternative regres-
sion specifications with firm- and forest-time trends. Second, I investigate patterns around
events graphically, looking for evidence of trends. Third, I use a triple difference-in-difference
specification, which has a much weaker common trends assumption.
6.3 Differential Change for At-Risk Species
Incentives to distort a species’ search cost parameter depend on the local distribution of that
species in that forest, which varies across species-forest pairs. To estimate differential changes
in production for at-risk species, I use the following triple difference-in-differences specification
(15):
yfst = ρBL,AR (BLft ∗ AtRiskfs)+ρInt,AR (Interimft ∗ AtRiskfs)+ρCert,AR (Certft ∗ AtRiskfs) +
ρDrop,AR (Dropoutft ∗ AtRiskfs) + αfs + λft + γst + fpst (15)
There are two key differences between this regression specification and the regression esti-
mating changes common across species. First, I include forest-year fixed effects λft. This
controls for changes common across all species in the forest at certification events and, unlike
before, allows these common changes to vary across participating forests. Next, event dum-
mies, which vary at the forest level, are interacted with a dummy coded for forest-species’
pair fs’s regeneration risk. AtRiskfs is an indicator variable equal to one if the species fails
regeneration criteria in that forest. Coefficients on interaction terms, ρEV ENT,AR, estimate
average differential change for at-risk species at events.
The triple difference-in-differences regression framework specified in (15) allows us to relax
the identifying assumption we needed to estimate the double difference-in-differences frame-
work of (14). There, we had to assume that firms did not choose to participate in FSC based
on time-varying shocks or trends. Now, we must assume that participation is not driven by
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shocks or trends unique to at-risk species, a much weaker assumption.
7 Results
7.1 Firms Change Harvesting Behavior at Baseline for At-Risk
Species
Table 8 reports differential changes in tree size at FSC events for species that fail FSC’s
regeneration criteria and are at risk of poor regeneration over time using a triple difference-
in-differences specification. The dependent variable is a measure of tree size, and the unit
of observation is a species in a forest in a given year. Each regression has forest-year and
species-year effects as well as fixed effects for each forest-species pair. Standard errors are
clustered at the forest-level. The table has two panels, one for each class of at-risk species:
poor regeneration and worst regeneration.
The broadest class of species where firms may have incentives to distort have “Poor regen-
eration;” These species fail FSC’s regeneration criteria, even if by a small margin. For some
species-forest pairs in this group, firms have already increased the diameter threshold in order
to satisfy Cameroon’s Forest Law. In this case, there is no payoff to the firm of distorting
tree size. Other forest-species pairs in this group are at risk of additional constraints from
the FSC auditor. Thus incentives to distort vary across units in this group. “Worst Regener-
ation” forest-species pairs fail FSC’s regeneration requirements for any diameter constraint.
Incentives to distort tree size exist for each of these units.28 If FSC is effective at increasing
protection of at-risk species from local extirpation, we should see increased average tree size
at certification for both groups. We might also expect to observe increases in tree size during
the interim period as firms implement changes in order to satisfy FSC requirements.
Certification does not appear to change average tree size for either at-risk species classifi-
cation, for any measure of tree size. There are three measures of tree size, raw average tree
size in meters cubed, the estimated diameter based on tree size, and the difference between
the diameter and the minimum legal diameter. Estimated changes at certification are noisy
28The “Worst Regeneration” species are a subset of the “Poor Regeneration” class.
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and less than zero for any of the measures. Similarly, interim coefficients are also noisy and
less than zero. We do find large changes in tree size – at the baseline audit event. For poor
regenerators, tree size falls by 0.8 meters cubed or a fall in diameter of 3.3 centimeters. For
species with the worst regeneration prospects, tree size falls even more, by 2.5 meters cubed.
The change in diameter is ten centimeters, a 21% decrease in the difference between aver-
age diameter and the legal minimum diameter. Ten centimeters is one diameter class and a
significant change from the auditor’s perspective because felling restrictions are done in ten
centimeter bins.
We can investigate whether the decrease in tree size at the baseline audit reflects an
unobserved downward trend in tree size using an event study specification. Figure 9 plots
timeline coefficients for years leading up to and after the baseline event using the following
regression specification:
sizefst =
∑
τ−1
βττft ∗HighRiskfs + αfs + γst + λft + fst (16)
Where τfst is equal to zero at the baseline audit. The reference period is the year before
the audit. Species-forest fixed effects and forest-year fixed effects are included. Errors are
clustered at the forest-level. In Figure 9 we see a sharp, temporary decrease at the baseline
event. Before the baseline event, there appears to be an upward trend in tree size, making the
decrease in tree size at the baseline event more striking. This upward trend is consistent with
general trends observed across the panel (see Figure 6). Tree size returns to the pre-event
trend immediately after the event. Tree size returns to the pre-FSC average around the time
when most firms certify, two to four years after the baseline audit.
7.2 Broader Evidence of Baseline Distortion to Inflate Opportunity
Cost of Constraint
Table 10 characterizes common changes in the quantity of trees felled at FSC certification
events and shows the robustness of the estimated increase in production at the baseline audit
across specifications. The unit of observation is a species-forest pair and the outcome variable
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is the natural log of the number of trees felled, ln(qfst). The reference period for event changes
includes all years prior to the baseline audit period.29 Regression specifications 1 through 4
include fixed effects for each forest-species pair. Moving from left to right adds different
controls. Regressions 2 and 3 include a time trend for each forest and species, respectively.
The time trend restricts the dataset to forest-species pairs observed for at least three years
and reduces the number of observations.30. Standard errors are clustered at the forest-level
for each regression, with 85 clusters for regressions without the time trend and 72 clusters
with the time trend.
Across specifications, I find a large, precisely estimated increase in production at the
baseline audit. Depending on the specification, the magnitude of the increase ranges from
52% to 81%. Most estimates of the change in trees felled at the baseline are around 81%,
what would appear to be an extremely high response. The high magnitude reflects the skewed
shape of production data, reflected in Figure 3 . Almost ten percent of forest-species pairs
have production of just one tree; another six percent have two trees felled. An increase of a
few trees will appear comparatively large for many species. Later regressions use production
in levels and total production for the forest and find an increase of about 60%.
The large increase in production at the baseline audit is temporary and abrupt. In the
regressions, the Interim coefficient is noisy and weakly positive and the Dropout coefficient
is noisy and weakly negative. If the change in production at the baseline audit reflected a
trend in increased productivity among participants, we should see positive production among
Dropouts. This is true for the Interim period, too - institutionally, the auditor does not issue
corrective actions to limit the quantity of trees felled.
We can investigate whether the increase at the baseline reflects an underlying trend of
increased production using an event study specification. Figure 10 plots timeline coefficients
29The reference period length varies by forest. Forests that join later may be different than forests that
join earlier. As long as firms decide to participate based on a time-invariant forest characteristic, this is not
a problem for identification but it can make the estimate of the change at the baseline event less precise.
Including a dummy variable for 3 or more years before the baseline audit restricts the comparison of the
baseline audit year to the two years prior. The magnitude of the baseline audit coefficient is roughly identical,
but standard errors fall by about 10%.
30Running regressions 1, 4, and 5 with this smaller sample improves the precision of the baseline coefficient
estimate. Magnitudes stay without 5% of those reported here. Standard errors for the certification coefficient
increase slightly for regression 4 but decrease for regressions 1 and 5
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for years leading up to and after the baseline event using the following regression specification:
ln(qfpst) =
∑
τ−1
βττft + αfs + ρpt + fpt (17)
Where τft is equal to zero at the baseline audit. The reference period is the year before the
audit. Species-forest fixed effects and province-year fixed effects are included and errors are
clustered at the forest-level. In Figure 10 we see a sharp increase at the baseline event but
no trend prior to the event. Production returns to the pre-event trend immediately after the
event.
Figure 10 confirms the temporary change, and shows further that it is abrupt. There is no
trend prior to the baseline audit driving the increase in production and production returns to
the unit average after the baseline event. Production increases at around the time when most
firms certify, but the estimate is noisy.
We can investigate the common trends assumption via regression specifications 2 and 3,
which include a forest and species time trend, respectively. With a forest-trend, coefficient
estimates for the baseline, interim, and certification decrease. The change at the baseline audit
remains positive and significant but decreases from 81% to 52%. Production during the Interim
and among Dropouts is negative, giving further evidence that the change at the baseline is
temporary. The production increase at certification, though imprecisely estimated, remains
about the same magnitude as without the trend. If an unobserved trend drove participation in
FSC, we would expect the change at certification to disappear when we include forest-trends.
Among the regression specifications in Table 9, the regression with the best fit has species-
year and province-year effects, Regression 5. I repeat this specification in column one of
Table 10. Table 10 looks at how quantity and tree size change at FSC events using this
specification. The table features three different transformations of the quantity of trees felled
across four regressions: the natural log of the number of trees felled, ln(qfpst) as in Table 9
(Spec 1), the raw number of trees felled qfpst (Specs 2 and 3), and a binary variable equal
to one if there is at least one tree felled, 1[qfpst > 0] (Spec 4). Unlike with log-transformed
quantity, we can include observations with zero trees felled when using the raw quantity.
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Specification 2 includes only observations with positive production to facilitate comparison
with the log-transformed quantity. Specification 3 includes observations with zero trees felled,
which increases the number of observations to over ten thousand. The last two regression
specifications estimate common changes in tree size using two measures: a gross tree size
average and tree diameter based on the gross tree size average.
Our theoretical model predicts that firms will distort production to make felling appear less
costly. Empirically, we would expect to find an increase in the number of trees felled across
all species at the baseline audit. Likewise, for species infrequently felled at all due to low
market price, we would expect the likelihood of felling to increase at the baseline audit. We
saw in Table 9 that the increase in log-transformed quantity was robust across specifications,
including a forest time trend. Here we see that the increase in felling is common across species,
whether infrequently or frequently felled. The raw quantity regressions estimate an increase
of 68 trees felled for non-zero observations and 54 trees when zeroes are included, an increase
of 57 percentage points in either case. Unlike in the log-transformed quantity case, these
estimates reflect the arithmetic mean, which is more sensitive to outliers, yet the coefficient is
very similar to the 65% increase estimated increase in the log-transformed case with identical
controls. This gives us further evidence that changes are common across species. Changes
occur along the extensive margin as well: a species is 12% more likely to be felled in the year
of the Baseline audit. Changes in quantity and likelihood of felling are very similar when
aggregated to the forest-level, as shown in Table 11.
Recall that we expect to find differential changes in distorting search costs. When esti-
mating common changes in tree size, theory predicts the average change across species will
be noisy and weakly negative. Specification 5 reports the change in gross average size, which
falls by .5 cubic meters but is insignificant. Using the diameter measure in specification 6,
we find an insignificant decrease in tree diameter of 4 cm at the baseline audit. Changes in
tree size from search may be better reflected by how tree diameter changes relative to the
legal minimum diameter, which varies by species. The final specification uses this outcome
and finds a fall of 4.8 cm relative to an average gap of 49 cm, for a 10% fall in diameter. We
can compare this to the change in gross average tree size, which corresponds to a fall of 7.8%
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when compared to the average tree size of 3 meters cubed. Table 11 reports the forest-level
average using the harmonic mean of tree size and tree size falls on average about 11%. It
appears that firms may seek out fewer large trees at the baseline audit, but the change is not
consistent across species.
Another way to investigate whether changes at the baseline audit are part of a broader
unobserved productivity trend is to look at how firm-level production changes at FSC events.
Firms manage a portfolio of forests, some that participate in FSC and others that do not.
If firms increase their total production in baseline event years, this could be evidence of
an unobserved productivity shock at the firm-level. Table 12 presents regression results for
firm-level production. The unit of analysis if a firm-species pair in specification 1 and total
firm production, regardless of species identity, in specification 2. Both regressions include
fixed effects at their respective unit of analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. Since there are only 33 firms, there are few clusters and we should be wary when
interpreting the precision of our estimates. Events are coded such that if a firm has at least
one forest experiencing a baseline audit or is certified, that variable is equal to one. If the firm
experiences both a baseline audit and a certified forest at the same time, their interaction
is coded as one. Specification 1 includes species-year effects while specification 2 has year
effects. Immediately we see that the estimated coefficient for baseline audit years is nearly
zero. This is in contrast to production when at least one forest is certified, which increases
by 36% on average for each species or 48% overall. We saw in Tables 9, 10, and 11 that
certified timber quantity increased at certification by as much as 80%, though the estimate
was noisy. Together with this table, it appears that firms may shift production among their
forests to accommodate overly inflated felling in the baseline period for participating forests.
At certification, the price premium legitimately increases total production, a response that
makes sense since certification is persistent, spanning several years.
When paired with Figure 10, regression results across specifications and outcomes provide
evidence that changes at the baseline audit fit predictions of participants changing production
to distort felling and search costs. Changes do not appear to be driven by anticipatory
behavior, unobserved trends, or a selection effect.
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Table 13 investigates differential changes in the quantity of trees felled for at-risk species.
The regression specifications are identical to the investigation of tree size in Table 11. Two
quantity outcomes are included for each at-risk classification, the natural log of trees felled and
a binary variable equal to one if at least one tree is felled. Our theoretical prediction is that
firms will not differentially change quantity for at-risk species. For both at-risk classifications,
we find no differential change in the likelihood of felling or the quantity of trees felled at the
baseline audit or any FSC events.
8 Conclusion
Finite contracts and high prices create incentives for firms to overexploit commercial timber
species. An innovative policy tool, FSC, addresses this problem by linking consumers willing
to pay more for sustainable timber with firms willing to incur opportunity costs from leaving
behind trees at risk of local extinction.
This paper investigated whether local biodiversity protection improved for Cameroonian
forests participating in FSC. A principal-agent model of firms and auditors yielded insights
in to FSC effectiveness. Auditors cannot incite firm effort because the FSC price premium
is common across firms and exogenously determined. We learn from the model that firms
have incentives to distort their production at the auditor’s baseline assessment. They trade
a second-order profit loss in the baseline period for a first-order gain in profits once certified.
These predictions are robust to different auditor frameworks, including a corrupt, constrained,
naive, or sophisticated auditor.
Empirically, I investigate these predictions using a dataset I created that links forest pro-
duction to local extinction risk. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I investigate
whether certification affords at-risk species greater protection. I find that firms distort pro-
duction at the auditor’s baseline assessment, felling smaller, younger trees for at-risk species
only. For species with the highest risk of local extinction, tree size decreases by 20% at the
baseline before returning to the pre-event average at certification. Firms inflate the opportu-
nity cost of restricted access to small, rare trees. I find no evidence that firms leave behind
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more small, high-risk trees once certified as compared to production before participating in
FSC.
Firms can inflate opportunity costs by distorting production along another margin, their
general felling productivity. I find a temporary, abrupt increase in production for all tree
species at the baseline assessment, consistent with firms exaggerating the opportunity cost of
harvesting restrictions. Total production for participating forest increases by 60%. Production
at the firm-level is unchanged in years with a baseline audit, suggesting that firms shift
production across forests at the baseline in order to accommodate distortion. In contrast,
total firm production increases by 36% once certified, consistent with a response to an FSC
price premium.
These empirical results contribute to two literatures, empirical work on dynamic contract-
ing and regulation and studies evaluating voluntary policies in developing countries. FSC has
policy design features that amplify the incentive problems known to plague dynamic contracts.
Many eco-labels rely on an exogenously determined price premium to incentivize changes in
firm behavior, and this work draws attention to how this limits effort extraction by the audi-
tor. Dynamic contracting is found in other policy arenas, such as time-shifting of electricity
demand and offsets for avoided deforestation. From this work, we learn that there are strong
incentives for firms to manipulate their baseline with a net result of no change in behavior.
40
References
Aguilar, Francisco X. and Richard P. Vlosky, “Consumer willingness to pay price premi-
ums for environmentally certified wood products in the U.S,” Forest Policy and Economics,
2007, 9 (8), 1100–1112.
Alberini, Anna and Kathleen Segerson, “Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve
Environmental Quality,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 2002, 22 (1-2), 157–184.
Amacher, Gregory S, Markku Ollikainen, and Erkki Koskela, Economics of forest
resources, Mit Press Cambridge, 2009.
Blackman, Allen, “Alternative Pollution Control Policies in Developing Countries,” Review
of environmental economics and policy, 2010, 4 (2), 234–253.
and Jorge Rivera, “Producer-Level Benefits of Sustainability Certification Beneficios de
la Certificacio´n de la Sustentabilidad a Nivel de Productores,” Conservation biology, 2011,
25 (6), 1176–1185.
, Bidisha Lahiri, William Pizer, Marisol Rivera Planter, and Carlos Mun˜oz Pin˜a,
“Voluntary environmental regulation in developing countries: Mexico’s Clean Industry Pro-
gram,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2010, 60 (3), 182–192.
Bottasso, Anna and Maurizio Conti, “Price cap regulation and the ratchet effect: a
generalized index approach,” Journal of Productivity Analysis, 2009, 32 (3), 191–201.
Casarin, Ariel A., “Productivity throughout regulatory cycles in gas utilities,” Journal of
Regulatory Economics, 2014, 45 (2), 115–137.
Cashore, Benjamin William, Graeme Auld, and Deanna Newsom, Governing through
markets: forest certification and the emergence of non-state authority, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2004.
Delmas, Magali, Maria J. Montes-Sancho, and Jay P. Shimshack, “Information
Disclosure Policies: Evidence from the Electricity Industry,” Economic Inquiry, 2010, 48
(2), 483–498.
Duflo, Esther, Michael Greenstone, Rohini Pande, and Nicholas Ryan, “What
Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-Party Auditors,” American
Economic Review, 2013, 103 (3), 314–19.
Earnhart, Dietrich H., Madhu Khanna, and Thomas P. Lyon, “Corporate Environ-
mental Strategies in Emerging Economies,” Review of environmental economics and policy,
2014, 8 (2), 164–185.
Ferraro, Paul J., “Asymmetric Information and Contract Design for Payments for Environ-
mental Services,” Ecological Economics, 2008, 65 (4), 810–821.
41
Foster, Andrew D. and Emilio Gutierrez, “The Informational Role of Voluntary Certifi-
cation: Evidence from the Mexican Clean Industry Program,” American Economic Review,
2013, 103 (3), 303–08.
FSC, Forest Stewardship Council, “Facts and Figures October 2014,” 2014.
Gamper-rabindran, Shanti and Stephen R. Finger, “Does industry self-regulation re-
duce pollution? Responsible Care in the chemical industry,” Journal of Regulatory Eco-
nomics, 2013, 43 (1), 1–30.
Joskow, Paul L, “Incentive regulation in theory and practice: electricity distribution
and transmission networks,” in “Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We
Learned?,” University of Chicago Press, 2013.
Khanna, M. and L. Damon, “EPA’s voluntary 33/50 program: Impact on toxic releases
and economic performance of firms,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment, 1999, 37 (1), 1.
Khanna, Madhu, “Non-Mandatory Approaches to Environmental Protection,” Journal of
Economic Surveys, 2001, 15 (3), 291–324.
Kim, Eun-Hee and Thomas P Lyon, “Greenwash vs. Brownwash: Exaggeration and
Undue Modesty in Corporate Sustainability Disclosure,” Organization Science, 2014.
King, Andrew A. and Michael J. Lenox, “Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions:
The Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program,” The Academy of Management Jour-
nal, 2000, 43 (4), 698–716.
Kollert, Walter and Peter Lagan, “Do certified tropical logs fetch a market premium?:
A comparative price analysis from Sabah, Malaysia,” Forest Policy and Economics, 2007,
9 (7), 862–868.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole, “The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts,” Econo-
metrica, 1988, 56 (5), 1153–1175.
and , A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1993.
Lyon, Thomas P. and John W. Maxwell, ”Voluntary” Approaches to Environmental
Regulation, Aldershot, U.K. and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2002.
Morgenstern, Richard D. and William A. eds Pizer, Reality Check: The Nature
and Performance of Voluntary Environmental Programs in the United States, Europe, and
Japan, Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 2007.
Nasi, Robert, Alain Billand, and Nathalie van Vliet, “Managing for timber and bio-
diversity in the Congo Basin,” Forest Ecology and Management, 2012, 268 (0), 103–111.
42
Nebel, Gustav, Lincoln Quevedo, Jette Bredahl Jacobsen, and Finn Helles, “De-
velopment and economic significance of forest certification: the case of FSC in Bolivia,”
Forest Policy and Economics, 2005, 7 (2), 175–186.
Rivera, Jorge, “Assessing a voluntary environmental initiative in the developing world: The
Costa Rican Certification for Sustainable Tourism,” Policy Sciences, 2002, 35 (4), 333.
Roheim, Cathy A., Frank Asche, and Julie Insignares Santos, “The Elusive Price
Premium for Ecolabelled Products: Evidence from Seafood in the UK Market,” Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 2011, 62 (3), 655–668.
Sappington, David, “Strategic Firm Behavior under a Dynamic Regulatory Adjustment
Process,” The Bell Journal of Economics, 1980, 11 (1), 360–372.
Tambunlertchai, Kanittha, Andreas Kontoleon, and Madhu Khanna, “Assessing
Participation in Voluntary Environmental Programmes in the Developing World: The Role
of FDI and Export Orientation on ISO14001 Adoption in Thailand,” Applied Economics,
2013, 45 (13-15), 2039–2048.
Tella, Rafael Di, Alexander Dyck, Alexander Galetovic, and William W. Hogan,
“Cost Reductions, Cost Padding, and Stock Market Prices: The Chilean Experience with
Price-Cap Regulation [with Comments],” Economı´a, 2008, 8 (2), 155–196.
Vandenhaute, MARC and JEAN-LOUIS Doucet, “Etude comparative de vingt plans
d’ame´nagement approuve´s au Cameroun,” Yaounde´, Cameroun, German Technical Coop-
eration, 2006.
Veritas, Bureau, “FSC Certification System Certification Public Report: CAFECO,” 2013.
Weitzman, Martin L., “The ”Ratchet Principle” and Performance Incentives,” Bell journal
of economics, 1980, 11 (1), 302–308.
Wolak, Frank A, “Residential customer response to real-time pricing: The anaheim critical
peak pricing experiment,” Center for the Study of Energy Markets, 2007.
Wu, JunJie and Bruce A. Babcock, “Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment
Program under Asymmetric Information,” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
1995, 20 (2), 316–327.
43
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Trees Cut 96.912 (285.918) 1 4877 9215
ln(Trees Cut) 2.755 (1.895) 0 8.492 9215
Raw Size, m3 11.897 (6.187) 0.667 104 9215
Diameter, cm 109.386 (26.216) 28.017 321.186 9215
Table 2: Number of Observations by Forest-Species Pair and Year
Year
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
N N N N N N N N
Firms
28 28 26 25 28 27 27 189
Forests
70 71 72 85 84 81 80 543
Individuals
Zero Production 1,262 961 1,089 1,224 1,353 1,404 1,622 8,915
Positive Production 975 1,325 1,295 1,610 1,491 1,390 1,129 9,215
Table 3: Number of Units by Participation Status
Participation Status
Never BaselineTotal
Firms
28 5 33
Firm-Forest Pairs
80 18 98
Forest-Species Pairs
2,673 731 3,404
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Table 4: Dropped Forest-Species Pairs
Forest-Species Pairs
Num obs in panel Size under 1.5 Size [1.5,50] m3 Size over 50 Total
N N N N
1 obs only 5 1,202 53 1,260
2 obs only 4 670 1 675
3 or more obs 1 1,466 2 1,469
Total 10 3,338 56 3,404
Table 5: Dropped Observations
Observations
Num obs in panel Size under 1.5 Size [1.5,50] m3 Size over 50 Total
N N N N
1 obs only 5 1,202 2 1,209
2 obs only 4 1,344 2 1,350
3 or more obs 9 6,642 5 6,656
Total 18 9,188 9 9,215
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Table 6: Cross-Sectional Variation: Outcome Variables by Year
ln(Trees) Size (m3)
Year Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N
2003 2.840 1.874 0.00 8.06 975 11.9 5.32 1 47 975
2004 2.895 1.895 0.00 8.26 1,325 11.7 5.78 1 51 1,325
2005 2.873 1.913 0.00 8.03 1,295 11.5 5.80 1 54 1,295
2006 2.732 1.915 0.00 8.01 1,610 11.4 6.16 1 70 1,610
2007 2.704 1.868 0.00 7.89 1,491 12.1 6.44 2 57 1,491
2008 2.663 1.933 0.00 8.49 1,390 12.5 7.12 1 104 1,390
2009 2.597 1.835 0.00 8.31 1,129 12.2 6.15 1 53 1,129
Total 2.755 1.895 0.00 8.49 9,215 11.9 6.19 1 104 9,215
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Table 7: Worst Regenerating Species
Participate FSC
Scientific Name Do Not
Participate
Not
Vulnerable
Vulnerable Total
Afzelia bipindensis 57 18 1 76
Afzelia pachyloba 39 11 2 52
Aningeria altissima 32 6 1 39
Autranella congolensis 27 7 1 35
Baillonnella toxisperma 46 15 4 65
Ceiba pentandra 28 4 5 37
Cylicodiscus gabonensis 52 6 12 70
Detarium macrocarpum 38 6 5 49
Entandrophragma angolense 61 16 1 78
Entandrophragma candollei 70 15 3 88
Entandrophragma utile 75 11 7 93
Erythropleum ivorense, E. suaveolens 75 12 7 94
Khaya grandifoliola 11 2 1 14
Khaya ivorensis 61 16 1 78
Lophira alata 32 7 2 41
Piptadeniastrum africanum 45 12 2 59
Total 749 164 55 968
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Table 8: Tree Size Falls for At-Risk Species
Poor Regeneration Worst Regeneration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Raw Size, m3 Diameter, cm Raw Size, m3 Diameter, cm
Fixed Effects Forest-Spc Forest-Spc Forest-Spc Forest-Spc
Baseline Audit -0.809∗ -3.346∗ -2.515∗ -9.128∗
(0.389) (1.661) (1.137) (4.270)
Interim -0.171 -0.153 -0.888 -2.037
(0.611) (2.351) (1.715) (5.900)
Certified -0.495 -2.167 -1.373 -4.427
(0.957) (3.123) (1.680) (5.812)
Dropout -0.185 -1.028 1.868 8.753
(0.915) (3.564) (1.302) (4.714)
Constant 11.44∗∗∗ 107.7∗∗∗ 11.61∗∗∗ 108.3∗∗∗
(0.0910) (0.378) (0.0719) (0.310)
Species-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Forest-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7986 7986 7986 7986
R2 0.288 0.305 0.289 0.306
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the forest-level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 9: Changes in Quantity at Auditor’s Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity
Fixed Effects Forest-Spc Forest-Spc Forest-Spc Forest-Spc Forest-Spc
Baseline event 0.595∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗
(0.140) (0.152) (0.136) (0.143) (0.155)
Interim 0.249 -0.0818 0.254 0.220 0.0178
(0.345) (0.294) (0.368) (0.380) (0.429)
Certified 0.597 0.486 0.594 0.636 0.600
(0.330) (0.890) (0.336) (0.364) (0.342)
Dropout -0.317 -0.158 -0.351 -0.324 -0.284
(0.326) (0.536) (0.360) (0.361) (0.424)
Constant 3.005∗∗∗ 3.793∗∗∗ 3.585∗∗∗ 3.005∗∗∗ 3.002∗∗∗
(0.0839) (0.196) (0.229) (0.0857) (0.0810)
Year Yes Yes Yes No No
Forest trend No Yes No No No
Species trend No No Yes No No
Species-year No No No Yes Yes
Province-year No No No No Yes
Observations 7986 6642 6642 7986 7986
R2 0.027 0.103 0.073 0.143 0.172
Standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered at forest-level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 10: Changes in Production Outcomes at Auditor’s Baseline
Felling Outcomes Size Selection Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Trees Cut) Trees Cut Trees Cut 1[q > 0] Size, m
3
tree
Diameter, cm
Fixed Effects Forest-Spc Forest-Spc Forest-Spc Forest-Spc Forest-Spc Forest-Spc
Baseline event 0.502∗∗ 68.21∗∗ 54.21∗∗∗ 0.116∗ -0.894 -3.969
(0.155) (20.94) (14.45) (0.0451) (0.647) (2.793)
Interim 0.0178 -4.947 0.176 -0.0575 0.252 1.191
(0.429) (62.32) (42.40) (0.0664) (0.938) (3.795)
Certified 0.600 55.56 44.89 0.0687 0.536 2.579
(0.342) (69.51) (49.00) (0.0450) (1.035) (4.136)
Dropout -0.284 -41.73 -33.97∗ -0.0354 0.869 3.122
(0.424) (21.05) (16.76) (0.0338) (0.490) (1.990)
Constant 3.067∗∗∗ 119.9∗∗∗ 93.64∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗ 11.48∗∗∗ 108.0∗∗∗
(0.0674) (8.538) (6.571) (0.0189) (0.155) (0.655)
Province-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Species-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7986 7986 10223 10223 7986 7986
R2 0.172 0.106 0.088 0.191 0.160 0.176
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the forest-level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 11: Forest-level Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantity Quantity Share Species Harmonic Size
Baseline event 1545.3∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.109∗ -1.138∗
(369.4) (0.157) (0.0467) (0.567)
Interim 220.9 -0.00167 0.0246 0.307
(838.0) (0.477) (0.0540) (0.796)
Certified 1172.5 0.708 0.113∗ 0.203
(1030.8) (0.380) (0.0459) (0.943)
Dropout -477.6 -0.212 -0.0196 0.675
(540.0) (0.253) (0.0599) (0.543)
Constant 2490.9∗∗∗ 7.638∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 10.17∗∗∗
(162.1) (0.0818) (0.0222) (0.168)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 395 395 395 395
R2 0.143 0.136 0.076 0.056
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
51
Table 12: Firm-level Changes at Baseline Audit and Certification
(1) (2)
ln(Q) ln(Q)
Unit of Observation Firm-Species Firm
Baseline event 0.0219 0.0677
(0.115) (0.205)
Certified 0.309∗ 0.388∗
(0.122) (0.148)
Baseline & Certified -0.149 -0.0977
(0.207) (0.238)
Constant 3.451∗∗∗ 8.341∗∗∗
(0.0405) (0.0905)
Year Yes Yes
Species-year Yes No
Observations 4531 163
R2 0.236 0.203
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Table 13: No Differential Change in Quantity
Poor Regeneration Worst Regeneration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trees Cut 1[q > 0] Trees Cut 1[q > 0]
Fixed Effects Forest-Spc Forest-Spc Forest-Spc Forest-Spc
Baseline Audit, Poor regen 0.0578 -0.0481 0.333 -0.0240
(0.160) (0.0406) (0.221) (0.0899)
Interim, Poor regen -0.0191 0.0183 0.284 0.113
(0.198) (0.0613) (0.376) (0.139)
Certified, Poor regen -0.159 -0.0285 0.672 0.0183
(0.197) (0.0740) (0.450) (0.126)
Dropout, Poor regen 0.220 0.0622 0.752 0.0357
(0.270) (0.0613) (0.663) (0.0397)
Constant 3.406∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗ 3.070∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗
(0.0271) (0.00439) (0.0249) (0.00446)
Species-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Forest-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7986 10223 7986 10223
R2 0.371 0.284 0.372 0.284
Standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered at the forest-level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 1: Forest Allocated for Timber Production in Central Africa
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Figure 2: Trends Across Panel, Total Volume in Sector
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Figure 5: Geographical Variation in FSC Participation in Cameroon
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CHAPTER 2
Unintended Impacts from Forest Certification:
Evidence from Congolese Households
1 Abstract
Forest Stewardship Council’s (FSC) certifies forests where timber management is “socially
beneficial.” To satisfy this criterion, a certified timber firm in Congo built a road connecting
villages to a regional trade network and facilitated trade in agricultural goods. A model of
a rural household predicts changes in consumption, production, and wealth from the new
road connection depending on a household’s comparative advantage in production. Primary
data collected along the boundary of a certified and an uncertified forest management unit
in the Republic of Congo shows that household nutrition changes with certification. Certified
households decrease the frequency of animal protein consumption by one third, so that half
of the time, certified households report eating no animal protein. Indigenous households, net
buyers of farmed starch, shift consumption to starch foraged from the forest, a source inferior
in calories. Non-indigenous, farming households increase the number of fields they cultivate
and decrease the fallow period for existing fields, threatening long term soil productivity.
These households then invest their increased wealth in their dwelling, investing in walls made
of sawnwood.
2 Introduction
Independent certification of sustainable production of commodities such as timber has emerged
as a new governance tool, promising to address development needs of forest-dependent commu-
nities. Voluntary labels claiming to certify sustainable production have proliferated without
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evidence as to their effectiveness. Benefits to local households depend on which activities the
firm chooses to implement and how these activities interact with the local context. There is
reason to hope that certified firms may be able to provide services in contexts where developing
country states fail to do so. For example, certified timber firms have better local knowledge
than the state and since they are consistently monitored by an independent auditor, they have
incentives to provide these services.
Skeptics point out that this new governance tool creates a new incentive problem for devel-
opment activities, this time seated with the firm. Firms have incentives to choose development
activities that are the least costly to them. When selecting among activities, they may be
more likely to choose activities that benefit local elites. Finally, external monitoring creates
incentives for them to choose activities that are easily legible to the independent auditor.
For certified timber firms in tropical forests, the development challenges they might address
are manifold. On average, people living in tropical forests are more likely to suffer from
malnutrition and extreme poverty. Disease loads are higher. Average literacy is very low.
Dependence on forest resources for food and shelter is very high. Yet interventions pose
two risks. First, they may change the distribution of benefits. Benefits may accrue to those
most prepared to respond to new development opportunities and vulnerable groups may find
themselves worse off. Second, interventions may bring about negative externalities from poorly
selected implementation activities.
This paper investigates how activities implemented to satisfy FSC requirements change
outcomes for forest households in northern Republic of Congo. I pay special attention to the
distribution of benefits between indigenous and non-indigenous people. Using primary data
I collected in Congo, I compare outcomes for 190 households on either side of the boundary
between an FSC-certified forest and an uncertified forest.
The firm’s primary activity implemented to satisfy FSC requirements was to construct a
road segment linking five previously isolated villages to a regional road network. Villages in
the non-FSC forest management unit remain inaccessible by road. The FSC-certified firm then
encouraged trade of agricultural products from certified villages by constructing a marketplace
in one village and making periodic trips to the villages to purchase food products. Roads
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facilitate access to game by hunters, both locals and non-locals. Recognizing the risk of
defaunatation from the road, the firm also implemented protocols to control hunting.
We can think of the change from certification as a shift from autarky to trade for certified
villages and make predictions as to how households will change consumption and production.
The road changes relative prices, increasing the price of foodstuffs demanded for export.
Foodstuffs demanded for export include wild protein and farmed starch. We expect to see
total production increase, but we also expect to find winners and losers within connected
villages. Households with a comparative advantage in producing wild protein or farmed
starch will fare better than those that previously traded for those goods. In the short run,
we expect all households to shift production toward exported goods within the constraints of
their production technology. For households with a comparative advantage in the production
of export goods, we expect to see an increase in wealth.
Empirically, I find evidence that fits this story. Households with a comparative advantage
in exported foodstuffs have little change in their food consumption, whereas households that
previously traded their labor for food decrease their consumption of exported food. Comapra-
tive advantage in protein production does not vary consistently across ethnic groups. The
likelihood that the average household consumes any animal protein the previous day falls by
a third for certified households. Put another way, the frequency of no protein days increases
by an additional 1.5 days per week. Households that specialize in fish production are less
affected.
In contrast, comparative advantage in starch production varies by ethnic group. Indigenous
people specialize in foraged starch but depend on seasonal access to farmed starch during
periods when foraged starch yields are low. Farmed starch is higher in calories per unit
mass and, prior to certification, yielded greater volume per hour of labor. With certification,
non-indigenous households export farmed starch and forager households turn toward foraged
starch to meet their calorie needs. For indigenous households in certified villages, we see
substitution toward forager starch, which is inferior in calories per unit mass and requires
great labor intensity per calorie during this time of year.
All households respond to new trade opportunities by shifting their production toward
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exported agricultural goods. Non-indigenous, farmer households both intensify and extensify
production. They intensify production by decreasing the number of cultivars planted, special-
izing in exported foodstuff. They extensify production by increasing the number of fields they
cultivate. Households may increase the area under cultivation by either opening up new fields
or by using fallow fields sooner. From the household’s perspective, using a fallow field repre-
sents a tradeoff across time: it is less costly in the short run but will reduce yield productivity
in the long run through loss of soil nutrients. From a social standpoint, faster fallow rotation
mines the soil of nutrients whereas opening up new fields contributes to local deforestation.
I find that households respond to new trade opportunities by reducing the fallow period by
about a half. These households appear to invest their increased wealth in their dwelling walls,
taking advantage of lower prices for sawnwood from the road connection.
This paper contributes to literature on eco-label effectiveness and the impact of road
connections on rural households. It addresses gaps in voluntary environmental policy effec-
tiveness by analyzing FSC, the most important label. It does so in a context understudied,
the Congo Basin. It contributes to literatures on indigenous peoples outcomes and traditional
development activities.
The paper is structured as follow. I begin by describing the institutional context of tim-
ber production, FSC-certified and uncertified, and characterize the rural economy of forest
dependent households living in industrial forests in Congo in Section Two. I then use a sim-
ple theoretical model to make predictions as to how consumption, production, and wealth
will change with a new road connection, comparing predictions across groups with different
comparative advantages in Section Three. Section Four describes how the the dataset was
generated and characterizes the study population. In Section Five, I defend the empirical
framework and investigate threats to identification. Study results are presented in Section Six
and Section Seven concludes.
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3 Institutional Context
This section gives the institutional context needed to interpret the study results. I begin by
describing a firm’s obligations to forest dependent households in first certified, then uncertified,
forests. A description of the rural economy of forest dependent households in Congolese
industrial forests follows.
3.1 Timber Production
3.1.1 FSC-Certified Timber Production
Forest Stewardship Council’s (FSC) Forest Management Certification is the most well-known
and well-respected among forestry eco-labels. Participation is voluntary. Ten principles and
criteria are used to assess the “responsibility” of timber production. The principles and
criteria that are most relevant to this study are those concerning rural development, indigenous
peoples’ rights, and controlled hunting.
Principle four states that firms must contribute to the “rural development” of forest users.
“Forest management operations shall maintain or enhance the long-term social and economic
well-being of forest workers and local communities” (FSC 1996). The spirit of this principle
is that firms are extracting resources from communities and they should compensate them
in some way. FSC is not a prescriptive policy; the activities implemented in order to satisfy
its principles vary from forest to forest. In the Congo Basin, one common way timber firms
fulfill their rural development mandate is by either resurfacing and maintaining old, derelict
public roads or building a new road that connects previously isolated villages to a broader
road network.
Timber firms in the Congo Basin choose to satisfy FSC requirements in this way for a
couple of reasons. First, roads are easily monitored by FSC auditors. Second, because timber
production in the Congo Basin is selective, these firms are skilled at road-building. Building
roads is a low cost way, in terms of capital, management costs, and materials, for firms to
satisfy the FSC requirement. Firms also elect to satisfy FSC requirements by building roads
because roads in the Congo Basin are in terrible shape. Development agencies, such as the
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World Bank, the IMF, the US Agency for International Development, and the United Nations
Development Program, promote resurfacing roads and building new road connections as a way
to improve development outcomes in the Congo Basin. The reasoning behind this is familiar
to economists: roads offer opportunities for gains from trade and increase total production.
Though roads in the Congo Basin need rehabilitation, they bring risks, too. The risks
most relevant in the Congo Basin are local deforestation, malnutrition, and defaunation.
Evidence regarding their impact on deforestation is mixed, as it depends on how local agri-
cultural production responds to changes in relative prices. The response is characterized as a
pressure-cooker or pressure-relief valve. If households extensify their agricultural production
and convert more forest to fields in order to respond to higher prices for agricultural goods,
local deforestation will increase. If food is cheaper to import than produce after the road is
built or resurfaced, deforestation will decrease.
Though roads promise to increase the size of the pie, impacts will be heterogeneous across
households in the economy. A change in prices begets winners and losers, which in the short
run depend on the location of a household’s original endowment and in the long run depend
on how easily the household can shift production in response the price change. An equity
concern specific to the Congo Basin is if indigenous groups suffer more from changes in road
connections. Criteria 3.2 explicitly governs resource access for indigenous peoples, stating that
“forest management shall not threaten or diminish, either directly or indirectly, the resources
or tenure rights of indigenous peoples” (FSC, 1996). In the context of the Motaba River,
this criterion is most relevant with regard to BaAka access to wild protein, wild starch, and
farmed starch, given their seasonal starch provision strategy.
Roads have been shown to be devastating for local fauna, as they facilitate access by
hunters to previously inaccessible tracts of forests and encourage trade of bushmeat. Recog-
nizing this, the state requires all forests to implement controlled hunting protocols. However,
this requirement remains poorly enforced in uncertified forest management units. FSC also
requires controlled hunting protocols. Criteria 6.2 states that “inappropriate hunting, fishing,
trapping and collecting shall be controlled” (FSC, 1996). Activities satisfying this criterion
include control posts on roads to check for illegal trade in wildlife, seasonal and annual per-
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mits, and patrols of hunting zones. In certified forests, firms are consistently monitored and
compliance is better. The certified firm under study is recognized as having one of the most
sophisticated and far-reaching anti-poaching programs.
The timeline for production and road-building activities begins in 2002. Figure 12 shows
a map of the study site, where the Motaba River acts as the boundary between the certified
and uncertified forest management units. In 2002 the certified firm, Congolaise Industrielle
du Bois (CIB), signed a contract with the Congolese government and that granted rights to
timber production in Loundoungou FMU for a period of fifteen years. In 2003, Thanry Congo
began production in the uncertified Ipendja FMU and CIB began production in the north
of the Loundoungou FMU. 1 In 2007, CIB resurfaced the road connecting the Loundoungou
sawmill town to Makao and built a bridge across the Motaba River. This is the road sweeping
from the bottom left corner of Figure 12 to the towns of Makao and Ipendja. At about this
same time, CIB built the smaller road that branches off of this main road south of the Motaba,
connecting the five certified villages and ending in Bangui Motaba. The Loundoungou sawmill
was constructed between 2008-2009.
3.1.2 Uncertified Timber Production
The Motaba River forms the boundary between the certified and uncertified forest concessions.
De jure, all forest management units have a responsibility to provide services to communities
living within their forests. These social obligations are negotiated between the Congolese
State and the timber firm and described in the contract as the cahiers des charges. These
obligations are typically haphazard, modest, and their implementation is not enforced by
the State. In the case of the Motaba River, the social obligations specified in the Ipendja
forest concession had not changed road access for the three study villages. Study participants
frequently complained that they had not seen benefits from Thanry Congo. Thus, we can
interpret this study as an evaluation of the causal impact of FSC activities as compared to
de facto timber management in Congo, where timber is extracted and no social services are
provided by the firm.
1In 2005, Loundoungou and Toukoulaka FMU were combined into one FMU. The FMU in Figure 12
includes both FMUs.
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3.2 The Rural Economy of the Motaba River
Even with FSC certification and the new road connection, households remain focused on
autoconsumption and production of agricultural goods. Logging activities are concentrated
in the town that accompanies the sawmill and in the timber camp, which moves around
within the forest concession depending on which part of the forest is being logged. The
sawmill site for Thanry is Ipendja, visible in Figure 12, and for CIB it is Loundougou, which
is south of this map. Both are several hours drive from the villages along the Motaba. Some
households do seasonal work for the timber company, such as helping with forest inventories
but firms typically prefer to hire individuals with better literacy and greater experience in
timber production.
3.2.1 The Motaba River
Before FSC certification, for villages on either side of the Motaba River the primary method
of trade was either to travel to a town with a market or to trade with merchants traveling
up or down the Motaba by boat (Kitanishi, 1995). As seen in Figure 12, directly north and
south of the study site are two towns, Makao and Djube´. These towns are much larger, with
over one thousand inhabitants each. They have weekly markets active since before the road
connection. Merchants travel down the Motaba River by boat selling manufactured goods
and buying agricultural goods from villagers. For villages connected by road, merchants come
by truck or motorcycle. The price of imported goods falls when a village is connected by
road, most notably for housing materials, such as sawnwood, and imported medicine, such as
antibiotics.
The Motaba River begins north of the study site, flowing southward to eventually join
the Ubangi River. The river runs roughly southeast. Figure 12 shows the study site, about
a 20 mile stretch of the Upper Motaba. Within this segment, historical settlement patterns
reflect colonial prerogatives during World War II. Villagers were forced to resettle along the
river to facilitate monitoring by the French colonial government. During resettlement, clans
chose sites with a suitable sandy bay for launching and receiving dugout canoes. For the
study site’s stretch of the Motaba, villages north of 17.31 longitude are on the east side of
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the river whereas villages south of this latitude are on the west side of the river. Ecology
and demographics change along the Motaba River gradient. Semi-nomadic BaAka households
form trade partnerships with permanent households in both the Upper and Lower Motaba.
When compared to the Lower Motaba, the Upper Motaba has weaker fishing productivity and
the Kaka ethnic group dominates, whereas Lower Motaba settlements are majority Bondongo
households.
3.2.2 The Rural Economy
The main production activities for households along the Upper Motaba River include food and
shelter production and artisanal work. With regard to food, household members may farm,
forage in the forest, hunt, or fish for themselves or they may do so for another household in
exchange for payment. Households use labor, in conjunction with human and physical capital
such as machetes, guns, snares, harpoons, or fish traps, to produce starch and protein to eat
and trade. Land rights are inherited and there was no evidence of a shortage of suitable sites
for planting.
Households have a comparative advantage in protein activities, specializing in fishing or
hunting. Fishing and hunting are mostly done by men and require specialized knowledge of
tools, such as fish traps or rifles, and the most effective places to put these tools. Fisher and
hunter expertise does not break down neatly along ethnic lines. For the indigenous group,
the BaAka, men may specialize in one or the other, or both. Generally, Bondongo households
have greater fishing expertise, as seen by a wider range of fishing techniques and greater
participation in fishing. Kaka, on the other hand, have greater hunting expertise and are
more likely to spend extended periods of time in the forest on hunting trips. To identify a
household’s comparative advantage in protein production, I rely on the presence of specialized
tools rather than ethnic group affiliation.
In contrast to protein provision, starch provision expertise breaks down along ethnic lines.
BaAka, the indigenous group, specialize in foraged starch whereas all other ethnic groups
focus on farmed starch. During the dry season, from November to February, foraged starch is
less abundant and all households rely on farmed starch as their main calorie source. Farmed
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starch includes manioc, plantains, or sweet potatoes. These foodstuffs are more calorie dense
per unit mass and are less perishable than foraged starch, particularly manioc, which can be
processed in a variety of ways to extend its shelf life. They are also in high demand for export.
Logging company employees in logging towns hail from Cameroon, Central African Republic,
or the Democratic Republic of the Congo and are familiar with these farmed starches.
On average, each ethnic group cultivates some manioc. Agricultural investments by indige-
nous households households are modest compared to Bantu households. When not trading
labor for farmed starch, BaAka rely on manioc from their own fields or foraged starch from the
forest. Because of this distinction in starch comparative advantage, I label BaAka households
as “forager households” and Bantu households as “farmer households” in the empirical anal-
ysis. Among Bantu households, the majority are either Kaka and Bondongo, both of which
cultivate fields of corn and manioc. Historically, the Bondongo have been recognized as more
sophisticated farmers, growing a more diverse set of cultivars and planting larger fields, on
average.
Semi-nomadic, BaAka households are experts at foraging starch, fruit, mushrooms, and
other foodstuffs in the forest. The BaAka are indigenous to the Congo Basin forest and are
genetically distinct from more recent arrivals (Quintana-Murci et al., 2008). Their starch
provision strategy has evolved in step with seasonal changes in wild roots and tubers. During
the dry season, when the survey was implemented, the main foraged starches are ekoule and
mela. Forest starch, in general, is less abundant during the dry season. BaAka and Bantu
farmers have developed a symbiotic relationship emerged where BaAka spend time in villages
during the dry season trading their labor in Bantu fields for calorie rich farmed starch, among
other things. Historically, access to farmed starch during the dry season has been critical
for forager households for three reasons. One, they need to replenish glycogen stores after
spending a long period of time in the forest. Two, foraged starch is less abundant during this
time of year, thus the farmed starch serves as part of an annual starch strategy. And three,
the labor of clearing fields and harvesting manioc for farmer households is physically taxing,
requiring a more calorie dense starch.
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4 Theoretical Model
The theoretical model simplifies the rural economy and describes how it changes with activi-
ties implemented to satisfy FSC certification. After describing the model, I make predictions
for how consumption, production, and wealth will change for households with different com-
parative advantages.
4.1 Model Primitives
Imagine an autarkic, rural economy with many households. Households are producers and
consumers of foodstuffs, which may be produced from agriculture, foraging, hunting, or fishing.
Each household has a stock of potential labor, L¯, that they divide between food production
work ls and other work or leisure ld. Households use work to produce food y via the production
technology:
ys = f(ls, K,A) (1)
Where K is physical capital, and A is human capital. Human capital includes experience
and expertise gained through cultural practices. The production technology, f(.), is identical
for all households and is continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave in each
factor. We can rewrite the production problem as the pareto possibilities frontier, F (ys, ls).
Households derive utility from consuming foodstuffs yd and other goods or leisure ld,
according to their utility function:
U(yd, ld) = g(yd) + ld (2)
Where U(yd, ld) is continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly convex. I model the
household’s utility function as quasi-linear in other good consumption because we only observe
food consumption along the extensive margin. With a quasi-linear utility function, the income
expansion path for consumption of the non-linear good will remain fixed beyond some income
level. Given that there are few food alternatives, this fits our context well.
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Households maximize their utility subject to a budget constraint, their income I.
I = ysp+ lsw (3)
Income is a function of household production {ys, ls}, which is optimized separately, and the
market price for food is p and the market wage for labor is w.
4.1.1 Competitive Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, total supply and demand for food and leisure within the rural
economy determines the relative price ratio p
y
w
.
py
N∑
n=1
ys + w
N∑
n=1
ls = py
N∑
n=1
yd + w
N∑
n=1
ld (4)
By definition, for each household ls = L¯−ld. I assume that there are a sufficiently large number
of households such that the supply and demand of any one household does not change the
equilibrium price.
In competitive equilibrium, households maximize utility and profit from production sepa-
rately. When maximizing utility, each household consumes {yd, ld} such that their marginal
rate of substitution between food and other goods is equal to their price ratio:
∂U
∂y
∂U
∂l
=
g′(y)
1
=
p
w
(5)
When optimizing production, the household chooses the production bundle {ys, ls} that gives
the largest income I. In this way, preferences are separable from production. The household
chooses the production bundle such that the marginal rate of technical substitution is equal
to the price ratio:
∂F
∂ys
∂F
∂l
=
p
w
(6)
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4.1.2 Comparative Advantage
Households differ in their comparative advantage in producing food y. The shape of the
production technology, f()˙, is identical across households. A household with high physical or
human capital will have a comparative advantage in producing y as compared to a household
with low physical or human capital. Preferences on food and other goods or leisure may vary
across households.
If we simplify the economy to two households, one more skilled at food production than
the other, we can depict the competitive equilibrium graphically. We can show the economy’s
competitive equilibrium using an edgeworth box. Each household’s original endowment is ω,
the sum of their labor and food endowments determine the dimensions of the box. Preferences
are represented by the bowed curves emanating from each origin. Utility increases as you move
away from the origin.
Farmer
Forager
݌௬
ݓ
ω
CE
Food
Other 
Goods
More 
Other 
Goods
Less
Other 
Goods
Less
Food
More
Food
As compared to staying at their original endowment, households improve their utility by
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trading. The Farmer improves utility by trading food for other goods. The competitive
equilibrium price p
y
w
is determined by the original endowment and each household’s marginal
rate of substitution.
4.2 Prediction Changes from FSC Certification
The FSC certified firm changes this competitive equilibrium by connecting village to a road
network and facilitating trade with logging towns. This shifts the village form a competitive
equilibrium determined locally, through local supply and demand for goods and leisure, to
a competitive equilibrium where prices are changed exogenously through excess demand for
food from newly connected logging towns. Normalizing the price of other goods and leisure,
e.g. the wage, to 1, we have:
pc > p (7)
Each section below describes how households change their consumption, production, and
investment in response to the higher price from the road connection.
4.2.1 Consumption
Villages connected by road face excess demand for foodstuffs y. Excess demand changes local
relative prices as described above. In this section, I make predictions as to how a household’s
consumption of y changes with the new price. This will depend on whether the household
was a net buyer or net seller of foodstuff y at the original price p, which in turn depends
on the household’s comparative advantage in production. For predictions with regard to
consumption, I assume the original production bundle does not change. Short run changes in
the production bundle, evaluated in the next section, are likely to be small relative to the gap
between households with or without a comparative advantage in the production of foodstuff
y.
Consumption of y by the net seller will remain unchanged after the price increase, due
to the household’s quasi-linear preferences. Since they are comparatively richer given their
production bundle and the new higher price for y, these households enjoy other goods or
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greater leisure, which they may invest in other activities. For net buyers of y, the new price
shrinks their budget set. They reduce their consumption of y as well as their consumption of
other goods and leisure. They must work more for less food.
4.2.2 Production
The changes in relative prices from the new road connection for FSC-certified villages changes
incentives for agricultural production. In the short run, households will adjust by shifting
production along their pareto possibilities frontier away from other goods and leisure and
toward production of y. They will continue to shift toward production of foodstuff y until the
point at which the marginal rate of technical substitution is equal to the price ratio of food
to other goods and leisure:
∂F
∂y
∂F
∂l
=
p
w
(8)
Households with a comparative advantage in the production of foodstuff y will increase
their demand for agricultural labor. If Farmer households increase demand for external agri-
cultural labor, the wage rate should increase. In this way, households with a comparative
advantage in other work or leisure ld may share in the benefits from the new road connection.
Farmer households may instead draw from their stock of potential labor L¯ depending on the
shadow value of their time.
Households with a comparative advantage in the production of y will unambiguously have
an increased budget set after certification increases the price of y. These households are now
wealthier and, given a quasi-linear utility function, they will have a larger endowment of other
goods and leisure. They may choose to spend these resources on other investments, such as
improving their dwelling, something I investigate in the next section.
Changes in meat production deserve a special note because the firm’s controlled hunting
protocol changes the shape of a household’s pareto possibility frontier. The price of meat
increases like that of other exportable foodstuffs. However, unlike for agricultural production
or fishing, FSC activities change the production technology in two competing ways. Roads
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enable access to game and may improve meat yield. Controlled hunting measures restrict
access to munitions and increase the cost of hunting by requiring a license. Their impact
together makes the prediction for meat production ambiguous.
4.3 Wealth and Investment
As we saw in the previous section, households with a comparative advantage in production
of foodstuff y will be wealthier after the road connection and increased prices of p. Because
preferences are quasi-linear, these households will not increase their consumption of y but
instead enjoy greater leisure and consumption of other goods. One way they might spend
revenues from the sale of y and invest these resources in better housing services by improving
their dwelling.
Suppose a household can improve the quality of their dwelling H via labor,
H = H0 + h(L¯− ls) (9)
Suppose further that households may upgrade the materials of their dwelling - the walls and
roof - from local materials to more durable materials that are now cheaper to import. In this
case, we would predict that net seller households can use their increased income, additional
leisure, and lower price of durable housing materials to invest in dwelling upgrades.
5 Data
For this study, I use primary data collected expressly to investigate how FSC changes outcomes
for local forest-dependent households along the Motaba River in the Republic of Congo.
Below, I first walk through the data generation process. I then discuss observable household
characteristics and how they differ across the two sides of the Motaba River. Finally, I discuss
evidence from the survey for a shift from autarky to trade with the new road connection.
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5.1 Survey Methodology
The data come from a household survey of 190 participating households living in nine village
along the Upper Motaba River from November 2012 to February 2013. The Motaba River
demarcates the boundary between a certified and an uncertified forest concession. The nine
study villages described in Table 14 begin south of the town of Makao and end north of the
town of Djoube´. Six of the villages are on the certified side of the Motaba River. In order
along the River, the certified villages are Ipenda-Pape, Beye, Seke, Moulapa, Anikou, and
Bangui Motaba. The uncertified villages, in order, are Likombo, Zingo, and Bodzuanda. The
number of participating households in each village ranges from six to seventy-nine. The time
in each village corresponded roughly to the number of participants.
The study takes place within one season, the 2012 main dry season. The dry season begins
in November and ends in February and is the time of year when semi-nomadic households are
most likely to be spend time in the village (Kitanishi, 1995)(Riddell and Obongo, 2011). I
randomized the visit order for the study villages prior to the start of the survey. The survey
dates for each village are included in Table 14.
The survey sampling scheme was a simple census. All households in the village were
recruited to participate. Participation was voluntary and either the enumerator or the house-
hold could refuse participation. Table 15 relates the census of all village households to survey
participation. Nine households refused to participate when approached. The primary reason
given for refusal by these households was that the occupants were too old or unwell to partic-
ipate in a two hour long survey. 31 households were refused by the enumerator, all of these
households were in one neighborhood of Bangui-Motaba, Bobate. The Bobate neighborhood
was insisting on additional fees for participation and not adhering to the original agreement,
so I terminated surveys in that village. Before we stopped surveying in Bobate, we interviewed
11 households. All regressions include these 11 households.
Participants or the enumerator could choose to stop the survey at any time. Seven house-
holds started but did not finish the survey. Finally, 51 households were absent during our stay
in the village, about half of which were from certified villages. The survey was given in either
French, Lingala, or BaAka and took no more than 2 hours per household. Survey questions
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were adapted from the ECAM survey in Cameroon and Michael Riddell’s thesis. Questions
were approved by the University of Michigan Internal Review Board. The survey was piloted
and revised from in Makao prior to implementation.
5.2 Observable Household and Individual Characteristics and Out-
comes
We can investigate whether households’ observable characteristics are different in certified and
uncertified villages using Table 17. The number of residents in a household is the same on
either side of the river, about 4 people per household. Most households plant a field, about
84%. The age of the household head is about the same, mid-forties. A household head is ”old”
if they are at least 55 years old or older. Rates for old household heads are similar across the
two sides. The Educated variable is a dummy equal to one if the household head has ever
attended school. Education rates, defined this way, are about the same at 74%. With regard
to observable characteristics, FSC and non-FSC villages appear similar.
In addition to generic household characteristics that may affect productivity, we would like
to know how a household’s comparative advantage varies across certified and uncertified vil-
lages. Table 16 reports comparative advantage frequencies across treatment status. Farmers
and Foragers are fairly evenly split within villages of either type. Farmers include all Bantu
households. Fishers are households that reported having fishhooks. We see that most house-
holds fish in this way and fraction of non-Fishers is about even across the two sides. Bantu
households where the household head claims a Kaka affiliation are expected to be adept at
rifle hunting. We find fewer Kaka households in uncertified villages, likely owing to the greater
ratio of BaAka to Bantu in these villages.
5.3 Mechanisms: Hunting Restrictions and Road Connection
Evidence of the effectiveness of the certified firm’s controlled hunting protocols can be found in
respondents’ hunting behavior Table 19 reports the difference in hunting behavior, reporting
the difference between not FSC households and FSC households. Positive values indicate
78
number or frequency of the outcome in uncertified households. We see that fewer certified
households have a rifle, any shotgun shells, or many shotgun shells. They are less likely to
hunt at night, a type of hunting forbidden in FSC forests. The total number of snares is
similar across certified and uncertified households, but the types of snares differ. Nylon and
wire snares are more effective at trapping game but are also snare more indiscriminately,
threatening protected fauna. Certified households report fewer wire snares, prohibited in FSC
forests, and more raffia snares, legal in FSC forests. Nylon snare usage is about the same
across certification status, though nylon snares are also illegal in FSC forests.
The FSC-certified firm builds a road segment that connects certified villages to a broader
road network. They also built a sheltered marketplace and helped organize a weekly market
on Sundays. Finally, the certified firm periodically sent a truck to villages to buy agricultural
goods to then sell to logging town employees. All of these changes increased the opportunity
for households to sell agricultural goods they produce.
6 Empirical Strategy
The goal of the empirical analysis is to estimate how the average rural household’s consump-
tion, production, and investment change as a result of FSC interventions. Furthermore, I
want to investigate whether these changes are driven by one intervention in particular: a new
road connecting the village to a broader road network. To do this, I compare forest user out-
comes for households living on either side of the border of an FSC-certified forest management
unit. In order to attribute these changes to the road, I compare how consumption, produc-
tion, and investment changes for households with a comparative advantage in exportable good
production to households those with less of a comparative advantage.
I begin by describing the regression specification, emphasizing the coefficients of interest
and their interpretation. Next, I make explicit the identifying assumption that must hold for
causal inference of this specification. Finally, using institutional detail and empirical evidence,
I investigate two potential threats to this identifying assumption.
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6.1 Regression Specification
The goal of the empirical analysis is to estimate how household consumption, production, and
investment outcomes change with certification. For most outcomes, we are also interested
in investigating how changes differ across households with or without a comparative advan-
tage in exportable foodstuffs. The most basic regression specification compares outcomes for
households h in villages v, estimating the difference between households in certified villages
and uncertified villages:
yh,v = α + βcCertv + γ
′Xh + h,v (10)
In this specification, Certv is a dummy variable equal to one if the village is on the east bank
of the Motaba River, within the certified Forest Management Unit. For all regressions, the
Xh term includes two dummy variables that characterize the household head: whether female
and whether the household head arrived within the last five years. For production regressions,
Xh also includes covariates that capture a household’s physical or human capital.
Most regressions investigate how certification changes outcomes for a subgroup predicted
to be important within the theoretical model. For consumption, we expect net buyers of
exported good y to reduce consumption only. So Subgrouph is a dummy variable equal to one
if the household has a comparative advantage in the production of y and is likely a net seller.
yh,v = α + βcCertv + βc,SG(Certv ∗ Subgrouph) + βSGSubgrouph + γ′X + h,v (11)
For production, a household’s response to new trade opportunities is limited by their existing
production technology. In this case, Subgrouph will indicate the household’s technology, e.g.
whether a Fisher or non-Fisher, or whether Farmer or a Forager. Recall that Fisher and
Hunter do not vary by ethnic subgroup but Farmer and Forager do, corresponding to Bantu
and BaAka households, respectively.
Households live in agglomerations in space such as neighborhoods and villages. House-
holds within the same village share unobserved shocks and likely covary. This makes each
observation less informative than if they were from an independent distribution. To correct for
this, I cluster the standard errors at the village-level v. Because there are only nine villages,
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this correction may make us more likely to reject the null hypothesis. This problem is partic-
ularly severe for estimates of regressors that change at the village-level only, e.g. the Certv
treatment variable. For regressions that interact certification with a household characteristic,
the likelihood of over-rejecting is less severe. To help understand the degree of intra-class
correlation within villages, I include results tables with robust standard errors that do not
correct for clustering.
6.2 Identifying Assumption
The identifying assumption describes how household characteristics change across space. I
assume there is no discontinuous change in unobserved household characteristics across the
Motaba River. Recall that the boundary of the FSC-certified forest assigns villages on the
west bank of the Motaba River to treatment; villages on the east bank are considered controls.
The historical settlement pattern along this stretch of the Motaba River created a longitudinal
pattern for treated and untreated villages. Villages north of 17.32 degrees longitude are on
the west, certified side and villages below this are located on the east, uncertified bank. As
discussed in the institutions section, village settlement pre-dates both forest concessions by
several decades. However, in order to identify the average change from certification, I must
assume that there is no unobserved effect that discontinuously changes at this boundary.
When estimating differential impacts across subgroups, this settlement pattern does not pose
problems because I am comparing outcomes across subgroups within certified villages.
Below, I use data from survey respondents to investigate two threats to this identifying
assumption: selection and sorting.
6.2.1 Potential Threat to Identification: Study Site or Study Activities Selection
into Treatment
The first potential threat to identification is if unobserved characteristics of local households
drive selection into treatment. Selection into treatment has two levels. First, unobserved char-
acteristics could drive a firm’s participation in FSC certification. Second, these characteristics
could determine the activities implemented by the firm in order to satisfy FSC requirements.
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In either case, observed differences in household outcomes across the treatment boundary
would reflect ex ante differences in local household characteristics, not changes caused by the
new road connection.
Evaluating voluntary policy effectiveness is typically fraught because, unlike in an experi-
ment, participation in the treatment is not randomly assigned. In this paper, the decision to
participate in FSC occurs at a much larger scale, decoupling it from local forest user character-
istics. The firm’s decision to participate in FSC certification occurs at the forest management
unit level. Two arguments make it highly unlikely that firms choose to participate in FSC
based on the characteristics of the five villages included in this study. First, the scale of the
participation decision and the scale of the study site are vastly different. Firms cannot certify
only part of their forest concession. The area of the certified forest management unit is 571,000
hectares and about 5,700 people reside within its boundaries. Loundoungou-Toukoulaka is the
last of three contiguous forest management units managed to be certified. The total certified
area is over 1 million hectares.
The 190 households surveyed along the Upper Motaba include 547 individuals, about
10% of the total inhabitants of the forest management unit. The firm’s decision to certify
is not based on the characteristics of these households along a short stretch of river. Firms
choose to participate in FSC if it is profit-maximizing to do so and the profitability of FSC
certification is primarily a function of timber stock, firm timber harvesting productivity, and
demand. Though household characteristics may affect the cost of complying with FSC’s rural
development mandate, the magnitude of these costs is likely dwarfed by costs from changes
in timber production and new revenues from an FSC price premium.
A related but distinct concern is whether an unobserved characteristic unique to the FSC
side of the River drove the firm’s choice to build a road connection. In this case, estimates
of the change from the road connection may in fact reflect ex ante unobservable differences
between the two sides of the Motaba River that incited the firm to select a road as their
way of fulfilling FSC requirements. Suppose the east side of the Motaba was more export-
oriented prior to the road connection. In this scenario, households would have been selling
their foodstuffs to river merchants or after traveling to a market town. If this were the case,
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we would expect to see different rates of skilled work - more farming on the FSC side, for
example - something we do not observe.
6.2.2 Potential Threat to Identification: Sorting in Response to Treatment
If households sort in response to treatment, the regression specified above will reflect differ-
ences in the treated and control populations instead of changes from treatment. Concerns
about sorting in response to treatment can be grouped into three types: households that sort
within the study site, households that sort into the study site (immigration), and households
that sort out of the study site (emigration). Sorting is likely to be limited because local in-
stitutions, e.g. kinship relations, govern property rights and access to dwellings, agricultural
fields, firewood, palms, hunting zones and fishing zones. These institutions mediate potential
immigration into treated and untreated villages. Below, I use survey responses to look for
evidence of each type of sorting using observable characteristics. Table 7 presents results from
a t-test comparing immigration status across certified and uncertified households. Positive
values indicate a higher frequency among uncertified households.
Kaka and BaAka households may more easily sort within the study area in response to
treatment because their kinship relations enable access to different villages. We see evidence
of more recent and less recent arrivals in certified villages. Recent arrivals came within the last
five years - after the road connection. Arrived last decade includes households that arrived
between five and ten years ago. In uncertified villages, we see greater arrival rates for both
periods, within five years and between five to ten years. The pattern is consistent before and
after the FSC treatment, however there are more recent arrivals.
Immigration into the study area by non-natives is only observed to occur when the non-
native is the spouse or dependent of a person with kinship ties to the village. The immigration
patterns mimics that of the arrival pattern for natives. More immigrants move to uncertified
villages than certified villages, recently and between five and ten years before the survey.
Evaluating emigration out of the study area is difficult because emigrants are not present
to answer survey questions. The fraction of households absent is similar across certified and
uncertified villages, as reported in Table 15. Another indicator of emigration could be different
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rates of female-headed households. These households may reflect emigration out of the study
area by men seeking wage-earning work opportunities elsewhere. In Table 7 we see a higher
preponderance of female-headed households in uncertified villages. I include a dummy for
female-headed households will be included in all regressions.
7 Results
The new road connection changes relative prices, increasing the price of goods demanded by
logging towns. This provokes changes in consumption, production, and wealth for households
in newly connected villages.
7.1 Consumption
The road connects excess demand for meat and starch from logging towns to remote villages
with excess agriculture and few imported goods. In Table 21, I evaluate how protein and
starch consumption changes with the road connection.
7.1.1 Protein Consumption
The relative price of wild protein, either meat or fish, increases in certified villages due to the
new road connecting urban consumers to villages. Some households are skilled fishers, others
hunters. Households that are net sellers in either product will see an income increase while net
buyers will see their budget constraint shrink. Column one of Table 21 shows changes in the
likelihood of reporting fish consumption from certification for fisher and non-fisher households.
Fisher households are identified as having fish hooks. For certified, non-fisher households,
consumption decreases by a large magnitude, 24 percentage points, a 50% decrease. For these
households, the increased price of fish has essentially eliminated fish consumption. Another
way to interpret this change is that non-fisher, certified households go from eating fish about
every other day to every four days. Fisher households do not decrease their likelihood of
consuming fish the previous day.
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Like fish, the price of bushmeat increases with the road connection. Meat consumption
during the dry season is low due to seasonality in the availability of game and additional
hunting restrictions. The unconditional likelihood a household reports eating meat the previ-
ous day is 19%. Unlike in the case of fish, certification brings two additional changes to the
likelihood of accessing bushmeat: additional hunting technology restrictions and increased
access to fauna. How bushmeat yield changes with certification will depend on the house-
hold’s hunting technology and access to hunting technology also changes with certification.
Gun hunters are expected to enjoy increased yields from improved access to fauna whereas
snare hunters are expected to experience decreased yields from a forced shift from nylon and
wire snares to less effective raffia snares. Since hunting technology changes with treatment,
I evaluate the average change in meat consumption. Column two of Table 21 estimates that
the average certified household reduces the likelihood of meat consumption by ten percentage
points, about a 50% decrease.
Finally, we can look at how consumption of any animal protein changes with certification.
Since we expect the price of animal protein to increase, we expect consumption to fall. Column
three of Table 21 estimates the change in animal protein consumption from certification. I
find that certified households are 20 percentage points less likely to report consuming any
animal protein the previous day, a decrease of about one third. Put another way, certified
households go from eating animal protein two out of three days to eating it less than every
other day. Also of note, independent of certification, female-headed households have trouble
procuring meat, likely because hunting is now exclusively done by men.
7.1.2 Starch Consumption
Starch is the main calorie source for all households during the dry season and farmed starch
is more calorie dense than foraged starch. The unconditional likelihood that the average
household consumes farmed starch the previous day is high, about 84%. Certification brings
a new road, which increases the price of farmed starch. Indigenous households, net buyers
of farmed starch, reduce their consumption in response to the higher price. Table 21 reports
regression results for three types of starch consumption. The outcome variable for column
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one is a dummy variable equal to one if the household reported consuming any farmed starch
the previous day. Farmed starch includes any kind of manioc, plantains, or sweet potatoes.
Column two is a dummy variable equal to one if the household reported eating starch foraged
from the forest, which includes ekoule´, a tuber, and me´la, a root, both of which are found in
the forest. Finally, column three is a dummy variable equal to one if the household reported
eating any kind of starch, farmed or foraged.
Certified, indigenous households are 12% less likely to report consuming farmed starch the
previous day as compared to uncertified indigenous households. Another way to interpret the
coefficient estimate is to convert it to the number of days per week without farmed starch. A
14% reduction in the likelihood of eating farmed starch is equivalent to about an additional
day per week without farmed starch. Farmed starch offers more calories per ounce and is more
reliably available than foraged starch. Certified Farmer households increase their likelihood
of consuming farmed starch by about the same magnitude, 12 percentage points.
To cope, indigenous households turn to the forest for foraged starch. Column two of
Table 21 shows that certified BaAka households are 14 percentage points more likely to report
eating foraged starch than uncertified indigenous households. The magnitude of this change
is massive; the unconditional average for foraged starch is a frequency of 7%, making this a
200% increase in the likelihood of eating foraged starch. The magnitude of the increase is
almost identical in size to the reduction in farmed starch consumption for certified, indigenous
households. In response to higher prices for farmed starch, certified indigenous households
appear to fall back on the forest as a safety net for starch consumption.
Farmer households report no change in consumption of foraged starch. Comparing the
coefficient for recent immigrants across foraged and farmed starch, we see that immigrants
are less likely to report eating foraged starch as compared to farmed. This makes sense since
foraged starch requires local knowledge, which immigrants lack.
Column six reports any starch consumption, farmed or foraged. I find no net change in
any starch consumption from certification. This masks BaAka households’ substitution to
foraged starch, which is inferior in terms of calories and may be more labor intensive, due to
a higher search cost during the dry season.
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7.2 Production
The road connection and increased demand for farmed starch provokes households to shift
production along their production possibilities frontier in the short run. A household’s increase
in agricultural investment will depend on its comparative advantage. We expect Farmer
households to increase production and of exported cultivars. For foraging households, we
expect investments that reflect their production possibilities frontier, which reflects their need
to spend time outside of the village and away from fields.
Table 22 shows how agricultural investment outcomes change across certified and uncer-
tified households, for farmer and forager households. The first three columns include only
the 87 farmer households as the regression population. The last two columns include all 190
households and an interaction term between treatment and household type.2 All regressions
include the same set of covariates, including whether the household head is female, a recent
arrival to the town, older, or ever educated. Below, I characterize farmers’ and foragers’
change in agricultural investment.
7.2.1 Agricultural Investment by Farmer Households
The first three regressions are restricted to the 87 non-indigenous, Farmer households. I
investigate three agricultural investment outcomes: the number of cultivars currently under
cultivation, the number of fields a Farmer household cultivates, and the number of fallow fields
a Farmer household claims.
Our prediction is that Farmer households will invest more heavily in the production of
exported foodstuffs in response to the new road connection. Increased production can occur
through intensification of production, extensification of production, or both. If Farmers inten-
sify, they apply inputs, additional labor, or plant improved seeds on existing fields. If Farmers
extensify, they plant additional fields.
One way to intensify production is to concentrate planting in the cultivars demanded for
export. Column one reports the number of cultivars planted, and we see that certified Farmer
2189 households because one BaAka household is missing education information. Will check codebook for
whether reported education there.
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households plant 1.6 fewer cultivars when compared to uncertified Farmer households. The
average Farmer household plants 5.9 cultivars, so certified Farmers plant about one quarter
fewer cultivars, which is consistent with intensification of production toward foodstuffs that
travel well and are in high demand by logging towns.
Column two of Table 22 indicates that Farmers respond to the new road by extensifying
production and increasing the number of fields under cultivation by one almost one field.
Farmer households in certified villages report an additional 0.87 fields, on average, when
compared to uncertified villages. The average number of fields under cultivation, for Farmer
households, is 2.3 fields, making this an increase about a third in the number of fields per
household.
In the short run, Farmers may extensify production by either clearing a new field or
replanting a fallow field after a shorter fallow period. Column three reports the number
of fallow fields per Farmer household to see if Farmers extensify by shortening their fallow
rotation. We see that the certified Farmer households have, on average, 1.7 fewer fallows
than uncertified households. The average household has 3.5 fallows, which, when taken with
the average number of active fields, 2.3, this corresponds roughly to a pattern of two years
on, and four years off. One way to interpret the change from certification is that the fallow
period has been reduced by about half, from four years to two. This suggests that, on the
plus side, households are not increasing local deforestation. However, on the negative side,
shorter fallows threaten long-term soil productivity.
Farmers’ extensification of agricultural production requires additional labor. Additional
labor could come from the Farmer’s own stock of household labor or could be supplied via
trade with Indigenous households. The source of the additional labor supplied depends on
Farmers’ shadow value of time. If labor is supplied by Indigenous workers, those workers
should receive a higher wage and benefit from the road connection. Given the fall in farmed
starch consumption by Indigenous households, it appears that Farmers use their own labor to
increase agricultural production.
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7.2.2 Agricultural Investment by Forager Households
Forager households have less physical and human farming capital but they too can shift
production in response to the road connection. Regressions four and five of Table 22 investigate
chicken husbandry and manioc processing for all households. Both outcome variables are
dummy variables equal to one if the household raised any chickens or processed any manioc
within the last year. Chickens are mobile and can be brought to forest camps if needed,
making them a strategic investment for Forager households. Manioc processing is familiar to
BaAka households, but typically was done for a Bantu household in exchange for other goods.
Certification brings a shift where BaAka process manioc either to consume or to trade.
We are interested in how Forager households change their agricultural investment, so the
coefficient on Certified Village is the main estimate of interest. We see a large, positive increase
in the likelihood of chicken husbandry or manioc processing. For chicken husbandry, the
likelihood a BaAka household raises chickens increases by 45 percentage points. On average,
50% of BaAka households raise chickens, making this nearly a doubling in the likelihood of
chicken husbandry. A look at the interaction term shows that though Farmers increase their
chicken husbandry, the change is smaller, about 14 percentage points.
This pattern is repeated for processing manioc into fufu, a powder that people sell by the
scoop. The likelihood a Forager household processes manioc for themselves increases by 29
percentage points, a 150% increase. Farmer households also increase the likelihood of fufu
production, but the change is smaller: 13 percentage points.
7.3 Housing Investments
The new price ratio makes households with a comparative advantage in exported goods wealth-
ier. This is most pronounced for Farmer households, who now have more leisure, more money
to spend on other goods, and can take advantage of lower prices for imported goods. One
of the imported goods with a lower price is sawnwood; the certified company has a policy
for distributing sawnwood that fails export quality standards. Thus, we might expect Farmer
households to invest their new revenues and leisure time in improving their dwelling, improving
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the quality of their walls from mud to wood.3
The first regression in Table 23 investigates how wall type differs across certified and un-
certified households for Farmer households only.4 We see that Farmer households in Certified
Villages are 34 percentage points less likely to have mud walls than those in uncertified villages.
Since the average likelihood of mud walls is .81, this is a decrease of about 41%.
Forager households dwellings are different. Forager dwellings are more often constructed
with walls made of leaves or palm fronds, a less durable material but one that also requires
less investment. Mud walls suggest a more permanent village presence. In column two, we
see that Forager households are 25 percentage points less likely to have mud walls in Certified
Villages. Given the average incidence of mud walls is about 35%, this is a 72% decrease. This
may reflect either lost leisure time, increased time spent in the forest, or both for Forager
households in Certified Villages.
8 Conclusion
This paper investigated how forest dependent households’ consumption, production, and
wealth outcomes changes as a result of implementation activities satisfying Forest Stewardship
Council’s forest management standard. I compare outcomes for 190 household living on either
side of the boundary of the Motaba River in the Republic of Congo, the border of a certified
and an uncertified forest management unit. I use primary data I collected for this purpose.
A theoretical model describes how the road changes villages from autarky to trade with a
broader network. We expect net buyers of exported goods will reduce their consumption and
net sellers will enjoy greater wealth. We also expect all households to shift production toward
exported goods in the short run, conditional on their production technology.
Exported goods include wild protein and farmed agricultural goods. Empirically, I find
that certified households consume protein less frequently, decreasing consumption by about a
third. In response to higher prices, indigenous households shift starch consumption to sources
3Households also improve the quality of their roof, from palm panels to metal. Metal sheets are cheaper
to import with the road. Metal roofs are only observed in certified villages.
4Wall type was assessed during the initial census. Seven households did not have an entry for the initial
census and thus lack wall type data.
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foraged from the forest. These sources are inferior in calories and more labor intensive due to
their relative scarcity during the dry season.
Certified farmer households intensify production by reducing the number of cultivars, fo-
cusing on agricultural goods demanded for export. They extensify production by increasing
the number of fields they cultivate by about one field. Instead of opening a new field, Farmer
households appear to reduce the length of their fallow period. Indigenous households also in-
crease production of exported goods, given their production technology constraints. Certified
indigenous households are more likely to raise chickens and process manioc.
Farmer households enjoy greater wealth from selling their agricultural goods. They also
enjoy cheaper prices for materials to improve their dwelling, such as concrete, wood, and tin
roofing. We see more non-mud homes among certified Farmer households, consistent with
their investment in improvements in their accommodations.
We learn from this work that implementation activities for sustainable forestry can have
unintended impacts on forest dependent households. Firms choose implementation activities
that are low cost and easy to monitor. They may choose activities that benefit village elites.
This paper reveals tradeoffs in voluntary environmental standards like FSC forest management
certification as a governance tool to address sustainable development.
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Table 14: Documenting Village Visitation
village FSC Latitude Longitude Num HH Survey
Start
Survey
End
Anikou 1 2.51938 17.28497 9 76 79
Bangui Motaba 1 2.50582 17.31132 79 5 36
Beye 1 2.52981 17.27217 6 58 63
Bodzuanda 0 2.44231 17.44804 20 64 69
Likombo 0 2.47728 17.37473 32 45 57
Moulapa 1 2.52244 17.28228 6 70 79
Pape 1 2.56042 17.21312 9 1 3
Seke 1 2.53211 17.26872 13 59 63
Zingo 0 2.46708 17.38973 23 38 44
Table 15: Participant Counts
Uncertified Certified Total
Terminated Survey 0 31 31
Refusal 4 5 9
Absent 22 29 51
Started Survey 6 1 7
Finished Survey 76 114 190
Total 108 180 288
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Table 16: Characterizing Comparative Advantage
Uncertified Certified Total
No. No. No.
Starch Strategy
Forager 34 69 103
Farmer 35 52 87
Total 69 121 190
Protein Strategy
Not Fisher 10 23 33
Fisher 59 97 156
Total 69 120 189
Table 17: Comparing Persistent Observable Characteristics, FSC & non-FSC
Mean (not FSC) - Mean (FSC) SE Mean (not FSC)
Residents in Household 0.114 0.291 4.130
Planted field -0.0272 0.0541 0.841
Age in years -0.476 2.504 43.23
Old Head of Household -0.0656 0.0660 0.232
Educated -0.0275 0.0659 0.739
Observations 190
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Table 18: Outcome Variables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Fish 0.479 (0.501) 0 1 190
Meat 0.189 (0.393) 0 1 190
Any Animal Protein 0.663 (0.474) 0 1 190
Farmed Starch 0.837 (0.37) 0 1 190
Foraged Starch 0.068 (0.253) 0 1 190
Any Starch 0.916 (0.278) 0 1 190
\ # Cultivars 5.908 (3.378) 0 12 87
\ # Fields 2.333 (2.631) 0 22 87
\ # Fallows 3.517 (3.365) 0 10 87
Any Chickens 0.626 (0.485) 0 1 190
Ever Fufu 0.426 (0.496) 0 1 190
Mud Walls, Farmer 0.813 (0.393) 0 1 80
Mud Walls, Forager 0.347 (0.478) 0 1 101
Table 19: Changes in Hunting Activity
Mean (not FSC) - Mean (FSC) SE Mean (not FSC)
Any Rifle 0.0837 0.0651 0.275
Any Shotgun Shell 0.140 0.0640 0.290
Many Shotgun Shells 0.134 0.0466 0.159
Hunt at Night 0.227 0.107 0.677
No. of Snares -0.150 0.494 2.362
No. of Wire Snares 1.262 0.783 2.203
No. of Nylon Snares -0.0254 0.406 1.058
No. of Raffia Snares -0.951 0.585 0.735
Observations 190
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Table 20: Identification Threat: Sorting
Mean (not FSC) - Mean (FSC) SE Mean (not FSC)
Recent Arrival 0.108 0.0594 0.232
Arrived last decade 0.0458 0.0507 0.145
Recent Immigrant 0.0892 0.0547 0.188
Immigrated last decade 0.0519 0.0416 0.101
Female 0.141 0.0575 0.232
Observations 190
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Table 21: Changes in Food Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fish Meat Any Farm Forest Any
Protein Starch Starch Starch
Certified Village -0.243∗ -0.0970∗ -0.204∗∗ -0.123 0.138∗ 0.00196
(0.0942) (0.0368) (0.0467) (0.0750) (0.0559) (0.0712)
Fisher & Certified 0.170∗
(0.0597)
Fisher 0.119∗∗
(0.0209)
Farmer & Certified 0.119+ -0.149∗ -0.00856
(0.0524) (0.0573) (0.0605)
Farmer 0.202 0.117∗ -0.0162 0.133∗∗
(0.111) (0.0469) (0.0176) (0.0349)
Female -0.000317 -0.163∗ -0.216∗ -0.0916 -0.0339 -0.106
(0.0511) (0.0495) (0.0683) (0.106) (0.0185) (0.0783)
1(Kaka ethnicity) -0.175∗ 0.283∗∗ -0.0431
(0.0560) (0.0814) (0.138)
Recent Arrival 0.0806 -0.0225 0.00903 0.0554 -0.0422∗ -0.0132
(0.0882) (0.0677) (0.0880) (0.0480) (0.0175) (0.0441)
Constant 0.507∗∗ 0.167∗∗ 0.747∗∗ 0.833∗∗ 0.0403+ 0.873∗∗
(0.0394) (0.0290) (0.0338) (0.0625) (0.0216) (0.0427)
Observations 189 190 190 190 190 190
R2 0.077 0.133 0.084 0.091 0.107 0.058
Standard errors in parentheses. SE clustered at village level. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 22: Changes in Agricultural Production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# cultivars # Fields # Fallows Any Chickens Ever Fufu
Certified Village -1.598∗ 0.873∗ -1.670∗ 0.457∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(0.618) (0.317) (0.651) (0.110) (0.0556)
Farmer & Certified -0.395∗ -0.162∗
(0.145) (0.0681)
Farmer 0.601∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.0442)
Female 0.223 0.512∗ 0.155 0.108 0.0837
(1.100) (0.174) (0.902) (0.0738) (0.142)
Recent Arrival 0.615 -0.543+ -1.259∗ -0.0919 -0.0351
(0.629) (0.259) (0.477) (0.0786) (0.0766)
Residents in Household 0.621∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗ 0.0565∗∗ 0.0482∗∗
(0.121) (0.0450) (0.152) (0.0121) (0.0131)
Old Head of Household 0.545 0.373 2.899∗ 0.0334 0.135+
(0.697) (0.404) (0.997) (0.0535) (0.0650)
Educated 0.727 0.513 1.421+ -0.0514 0.184∗∗
(1.003) (0.361) (0.719) (0.102) (0.0429)
Constant 3.599∗ 0.443 0.709 -0.0336 -0.384∗∗
(1.123) (0.408) (0.669) (0.152) (0.0796)
Observations 87 87 87 189 189
R2 0.177 0.084 0.320 0.249 0.396
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 23: Changes in Housing Investment
(1) (2)
Mud Walls Mud Walls
Certified Village -0.337∗∗ -0.253∗∗
(0.0391) (0.0541)
Female 0.0763 -0.165
(0.0913) (0.174)
Recent Arrival -0.247 0.0417
(0.136) (0.165)
Residents in Household -0.0321∗ -0.00756
(0.0131) (0.0151)
Old Head of Household -0.193+ -0.0431
(0.0837) (0.0750)
Educated -0.0126 0.150
(0.0855) (0.0854)
Constant 1.243∗∗ 0.466∗∗
(0.106) (0.111)
Observations 80 100
R2 0.254 0.092
Standard errors in parentheses
SE clustered at village level.
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 24: Food Consumption, Unclustered Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fish Meat Any Farm Forest Any
Protein Starch Starch Starch
Certified Village -0.243 -0.0970 -0.204∗∗ -0.123 0.138∗ 0.00196
(0.186) (0.0610) (0.0679) (0.0833) (0.0544) (0.0696)
Fisher & Certified 0.170
(0.203)
Fisher 0.119
(0.180)
Farmer & Certified 0.119 -0.149∗∗ -0.00856
(0.0977) (0.0554) (0.0780)
Farmer 0.202+ 0.117 -0.0162 0.133∗
(0.120) (0.0729) (0.0278) (0.0642)
Female -0.000317 -0.163∗ -0.216∗ -0.0916 -0.0339∗ -0.106
(0.111) (0.0792) (0.108) (0.0787) (0.0163) (0.0677)
1(Kaka ethnicity) -0.175∗ 0.283∗∗ -0.0431
(0.0771) (0.0640) (0.120)
Recent Arrival 0.0806 -0.0225 0.00903 0.0554 -0.0422∗ -0.0132
(0.0934) (0.0780) (0.0886) (0.0511) (0.0170) (0.0479)
Constant 0.507∗∗ 0.167∗∗ 0.747∗∗ 0.833∗∗ 0.0403 0.873∗∗
(0.177) (0.0565) (0.0639) (0.0629) (0.0315) (0.0563)
Observations 189 190 190 190 190 190
R2 0.077 0.133 0.084 0.091 0.107 0.058
Standard errors in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 25: Agricultural Production, Unclustered Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Cultivars # Fields # Fallows Any Chickens Ever Fufu
Certified Village -1.598∗ 0.873+ -1.670∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(0.764) (0.445) (0.733) (0.0960) (0.0553)
Farmer & Certified -0.395∗∗ -0.162
(0.126) (0.117)
Farmer 0.601∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗
(0.0993) (0.0921)
Female 0.223 0.512 0.155 0.108 0.0837
(1.015) (0.321) (0.906) (0.0802) (0.0801)
Recent Arrival 0.615 -0.543 -1.259+ -0.0919 -0.0351
(0.881) (0.573) (0.756) (0.0980) (0.0847)
Residents in Household 0.621∗∗ 0.234∗ 0.549∗∗ 0.0565∗∗ 0.0482∗∗
(0.196) (0.0938) (0.204) (0.0171) (0.0165)
Old Head of Household 0.545 0.373 2.899∗∗∗ 0.0334 0.135+
(0.815) (0.547) (0.822) (0.0742) (0.0749)
Educated 0.727 0.513 1.421 -0.0514 0.184∗∗
(0.995) (0.493) (0.903) (0.0704) (0.0665)
Constant 3.599∗∗ 0.443 0.709 -0.0336 -0.384∗∗∗
(1.284) (0.536) (1.143) (0.120) (0.0911)
Observations 87 87 87 189 189
R2 0.177 0.084 0.320 0.249 0.396
Standard errors in parentheses
Robust SE.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 26: Housing Investment, Unclustered Standard Errors
(1) (2)
Mud Walls Mud Walls
Certified Village -0.337∗∗ -0.287∗∗
(0.0751) (0.106)
Female 0.0763 -0.206
(0.106) (0.161)
Recent Arrival -0.247∗ 0.0248
(0.108) (0.170)
Residents in Household -0.0321+ -0.0101
(0.0180) (0.0263)
Old Head of Household -0.193+ -0.0538
(0.100) (0.116)
Educated -0.0126 0.113
(0.0945) (0.103)
Constant 1.243∗∗ 0.544∗∗
(0.127) (0.182)
Observations 80 100
R2 0.254 0.100
Standard errors in parentheses
Robust Standard Errors.
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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CHAPTER 3
Drivers of Participation in Voluntary Forest Regulation
and their Implications for Conservation
1 Abstract
Timber firms participate in legality or forest management certification if doing so increases
their profits. Participation in voluntary forest regulation begets new costs, such as compli-
ance costs from greater forest management effort or opportunity costs from enforcement of the
legal harvesting maximum. A theoretical model predicts that forests with lower compliance
or opportunity costs from participation are more likely to certify. For legality certification, I
find that firms with higher ex ante production costs, which imply lower compliance and op-
portunity costs, are more likely to participate. For Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) forest
management certification, compliance costs depend on forest characteristics. FSC compliance
costs are higher for forests with high amenity value, such as suitable gorilla habitat, or sen-
sitive areas that require additional management effort. Though these forest types are more
likely to participate in legality certification, they do not predict participation in FSC forest
management certification, suggesting that the highest ex ante production cost forests and
highest amenity value forests opt not to continue beyond legality to FSC certification.
2 Introduction
Timber firms earn profits by extracting timber to sell to global consumers in the export
market. Some consumers are concerned about the origin of the timber they purchase and
whether or not the timber was harvested legally. Other consumers are concerned with the
manner in which the timber was harvested and impacts on biodiversity and future timber
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stock. Both types of consumers cannot monitor the source or production process of timber
directly and instead rely on third-party auditors. Timber firms may choose, voluntarily, to
have timber origin or their production process monitored by these auditors. If they do so,
they incur additional costs when compared to unmonitored timber production.
Firms that choose to participate in legality and forest management certification incur
opportunity and compliance costs. Are firms that have lower compliance or opportunity costs
more likely to participate in legality and FSC forest management certification? If so, how
does this selection into legality and FSC forest management certification limit each policy’s
effectiveness at addressing overexploitation and biodiversity? Using data on biophysical forest
characteristics from 194 forest management units in Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon, I estimate
the determinants of participation in legality and FSC forest management certification.
I model how participation in legality and FSC forest management certification changes a
firm’s costs and revenues. Both standards bring fixed costs from audit visits. Both standards
enforce the legal harvest maximum for timber. Firms that harvest more than this maximum
when uncertified will incur an opportunity cost from participating. FSC forest management
certification brings additional management requirements that reflect biophysical characteris-
tics of the forest and the forest’s amenity value. For example, forests with higher biodiversity
will need to implement additional conservation activities and forests with more challenging
forest terrain will need to implement additional management effort to protect sensitive areas.
I test these predictions using proxies for a forest’s ex ante production costs and amenity
value. I geoprocess publicly available, time-invariant biophysical forest characteristics for 194
forest management units in Gabon, Cameroon, and the Republic of Congo in order to proxy
for production costs and amenity value. Proxies include include the slope of forest terrain,
annual precipitation, distance to the seaport, forest size, and habitat suitability for gorillas.
For legality certification, we expect forests with lower ex ante quantity and higher ex ante
management effort to be more likely to participate. In both cases, these forests will have
higher ex ante production costs, resulting in lower opportunity costs and compliance costs,
respectively. I test whether cost proxies for unobserved production costs predict participation
in legality certification. I find that forests with higher annual precipitation or greater average
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slope are more likely to participate. Increasing either characteristic by one standard deviation
increases the likelihood of participation in legality certification by 5-9%. The forest’s distance
to seaport, a proxy for transportation costs, also predicts participation in legality certification
though the magnitude is much smaller, 1.5 %. Though legality certification does not confer
biodiversity protection, I find that gorilla habitat suitability strongly predicts participation
in legality certification. I suggest that this relationship may be due to correlation between
gorillas and low human population density, which increases production costs, or from firms
responding to pressure from conservation non-governmental organizations.
FSC forest management certification requirements are tailored to forest characteristics.
In return, firms earn a higher price premium. Management reflects forest characteristics and
effort may exceed the legal requirement. Firms must also address forest amenity value. Forests
with higher amenity value, such as those suitable for gorillas, will have higher compliance costs.
The higher price premium reduces opportunity costs for forests with lower production costs.
Thus we expect reduced participation by forests with the highest production costs and forests
with high amenity value. I find that two of the three proxies for high production costs fail to
strongly predict participation in FSC forest management certification. Unlike in the legality
case, sloped terrain does not predict participation in FSC certification. The effect of being far
from the seaport is one quarter that of legality certification. Gorilla habitat suitability fails
to predict participation as well. Taken together, these patterns suggest that high production
cost and high amenity value forests choose not to pursue FSC certification. FSC fails to target
high conservation value forests and forests needing additional management, but I do not find
evidence of adverse selection.
This paper contributes to the literature on drivers of participation in voluntary environ-
mental policies. Like Morgenstern and Pizer (2007) and Vidovic and Khanna (2007), I find
that firms with low compliance costs are more likely to participate, making the overall change
from the policies small. This paper joins the few studies that look at voluntayr regulation
participation in developing country contexts (Blackman et al., 2010). Legality certification
has not yet been studied and voluntary regulation’s effectiveness in the context of renewable
resources in general and forestry in particular is poorly understood (Blackman and Rivera,
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2011). This paper’s empirical analysis addresses several of these gaps. The theoretical model
highlights a participation driver unique to producers of renewable resources: in addition to
compliance costs, firms consider opportunity costs when choosing to participate in voluntary
environmental regulation.
I begin by characterizing timber production and amenity value in the Congo Basin, legality
and FSC forest management in Section Two. In Section ThreeI use a simple model to give
intuition as to how eco-label standards may change firm costs follows. I describe the geographic
and administrative data I use in Section Four as well as in a Data Appendix. I introduce my
preferred regression specification in Section Five. Finally, I present my results and robustness
checks in Section Six. Section Seven concludes.
3 Institutional Context
Spanning over 180 million hectares, the Congo Basin is the second largest tropical rainforest
in the world, after the Amazon. In addition to tropical hardwood logs and sawnwood, the
Congo Basin provides globally important environmental services. In this section, I describe
uncertified timber production, the additional requirements necessary for legality and FSC
forest management certification, and Congo Basin forests’ amenity value .
3.1 Forest Governance in the Congo Basin
In my analysis, I focus on three countries in the Congo Basin1 Cameroon, Gabon, and the
Republic of Congo. These three countries are the most important for timber production
and as of 2009 they were the only countries in the Congo Basin with FSC certified forest
management units. Together, these three countries have 68 million hectares of forest. In
2008, they produced 9.8 million cubic meters of timber representing almost two-thirds of the
volume produced in the Basin and valued at approximately $1.7 billion in 2008 dollars (FAO,
2011).
1Characterizations of the Congo Basin include Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, the island nation of Sao Tome´ and Principe, Rwanda and Burundi in addition to
Cameroon, Republic of Congo, and Gabon.
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Across Central Africa, governments claim rights to all forested areas. The vast majority
of tropical forests exhibit similar ownership structures and 86% of global forests are publicly
owned (Agrawal et al., 2008). Governments delimit protected areas, which prohibit extrac-
tive activities, to keep intact some zones representative of key ecosystems and as well as to
act as source forests for foraging and migrating fauna. Governments also auction rights to
extract tropical timber from forest management units to private, profit-maximizing firms via
a “concession” system, which grants a 15 to 30 year lease to timber rights. Figure 13 depicts
the forest estate of the three-country region of the Congo Basin and its management struc-
ture. Protected areas have hatch marks and and forest management units are color-coded by
participation status.
Within the context of important ecosystem services and weak forest governance,2 private,
profit-maximizing firms manage over 32.2 million hectares of forest across the three countries.
This is almost half of the total forest estate. Concern over irregularities in tropical timber
production and increased recognition of the importance of environmental services provided
by tropical forests, such as carbon sequestration, has led to a spate of legislation in the
United States and Europe. In 2008 the United States amended the Lacey Act, a piece of
legislation from the turn of the century intended to prohibit the trade in endangered birds
and other animals, to include timber. The European Union’s Forest Law Enforcement and
Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Act of 2003 prohibits illegally harvested timber’s access to
European markets. Beyond trade restrictions for illegal timber, consumers and government
procurement programs are also sensitive to negative externalities associated with tropical
timber production, such as the opening of roads and destruction of forest canopy.
3.2 Uncertified Timber Production in the Congo Basin
Timber firms select trees to harvest and deploy management effort to protect residual trees
and soil or to improve harvesting efficiency. Congo Basin forests are highly diverse; a forest
may include over 400 unique tree species. The bulk of timber harvesting focuses on about
2According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in 2006, and Gabon, Cameroon
and the Republic of Congo ranked 90, 138, and 142 respectively among 163 countries (TI, 2006).
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twenty tree species. Because the proportion of commercial trees is small relative to the forest,
firms deploy a system of identifying trees for harvest and build an extensive road network to
access these trees.
Weather, topography, and a forest’s distance to the seaport affect production costs. Heavy
rainfall reduces the harvest period. Frequent rainfall during the harvest period slows down
production, increases equipment maintenance costs, and increases secondary road mainte-
nance and improvement costs. Forests with varying topography, such as steep slopes, make
maneuvering tractors and logging trucks more dangerous and time-consuming. Firms must
make skid trails longer and felling trees on very steep slopes risks soil erosion. In contrast, flat
areas facilitate road building and maintenance. Typically, forest management units feature
low population densities with few large agglomerations of settlements. Most industrial timber
is exported, so logs and sawnwood must travel from the forest management unit to a seaport
for export. Timber is heavy and bulky and roads in the Congo Basin are in notoriously poor
shape, making transport costs a non-trivial component of a firm’s marginal cost. Seaports are
often the closest city to the forest management unit
Firms may spend resources on forest management when uncertified. Basic forest man-
agement involves creating an inventory of trees in the forest and planning roads in order to
access commercial trees, improving timber harvesting efficiency. In uncertified timber pro-
duction, high management effort could include a census of the cutting area before harvesting
during which the firm notes the location, species, size, and quality of commercial trees and
geo-references their position within the forest management unit. The firm would then use this
census to plan roads to access commercial trees at lowest cost. In contrast, uncertified timber
production with little management effort would plan roads without knowing tree distribution
across space and harvest trees opportunistically. Investments in management effort can im-
prove harvesting efficiency in forests where harvesting is more complex. For example, a forest
with a shorter dry season can use the wet season, when harvesting is impossible, to create a
precise census and then use this census to more nimbly access trees during the dry season.
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3.3 Certified Legal Timber Production
Legality certification verifies timber origin, timber quantity, and minimum management ef-
fort. As of 2009, forests in Gabon, Cameroon, and Congo were legality certified by one of four
different standards: Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale de Surveillance (SGS), Bureau Ve´ritas, Forest Steward-
ship Council (FSC), and Rainforest Alliance. Legality standard rigor varies across these four
labels. I focus on legal compliance with the original timber harvest contract.
An independent auditor verifies timber origin by inspecting documentation such as the
harvesting contract and receipts for taxes paid. Timber origin must be documented from
stump to port. For example, criteria 6.4 of SGS’s Timber Legality, Traceability, and Verifi-
cation (TLTV) standard for Gabon requires that firms mark and register stumps, logs, and
trees and then implement a system of tree identification when prospecting, extracting and
transporting timber (SGS, 2008). This system must include a geo-referenced inventory prior
to exploitation and a harvest map. Implementing this system requires management effort;
firms purchase geospatial and timber tracking software, such as Helveta Ltd’s CI World TM,
and train or hire personnel to manage the timber tracking process. After verifying timber
origin, auditors verify that firms do not exceed the legal harvesting maximum. Continuing
with the example of SGS in Gabon, to satisfy criteria 6.5 firms must prove they have not
harvested more timber than authorized (SGS, 2008).
Firms must satisfy the minimum management effort required by law. Management effort
includes inventories and harvest maps, as described above, as well as legal protections for forest
amenity value. Biodiversity protection from legality certification is limited to the existence of
an approved forest management plan that respects the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES). SGS, Rainforest Alliance recognize that these requirements are
insufficient to protect forest amenity value and instead frame legality certification as a step
within a broader process that ends with forest management certification.3
3For example, Rainforest Alliance’s Smartwood certification is part of SmartStep, “a phased approach to
FSC Certification,” and “require[s] that verified organizations undertake activities to attain full certification”
(Alliance, 2011). SGS cite three categories of timber certification: “legal,” “legal progressing to sustainable,”
and “sustainable.”
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3.4 FSC Certified Managed Timber Production
Forest Management certification embeds the requirements of a legality standard within a
broader sustainable forest management standard. As of 2009, the only accepted forest man-
agement standard in use in the Congo Basin is that of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).
FSC’s mission, stated on their website, is that “The Forest Stewardship Council A.C. (FSC)
shall promote environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial, and economically viable man-
agement of the world’s forests,” where environmentally appropriate forest management is
further defined as “the harvest of timber and non-timber products [that] maintains the for-
est’s biodiversity, productivity, and ecological processes” (FSC, 1996). Through a consultative
process involving governments, industry, academia, non-governmental organizations, and the
public, FSC develops and revises global, national and regional forest management standards.
Before 2009, FSC forest management standards were unique to each of the three countries.
Since then, FSC has initiated a consultative process to define sub-regional standards for the
Congo Basin.
Forest management standards are forest-specific. Management effort reflects forest char-
acteristics, not the legal minimum. For example, Indicator 5.3.7 of the Congo Basin Sub-
Regional FSC standard requires that “Large scale maps shall be developed for all compart-
ments prior to harvesting, identifying compartment boundaries, protected areas, extraction
routes and depots within the compartment, and storage sites for consumer and production
wastes” (FSC, 2009). Areas important to the protection of threatened or endangered species
are set-aside and logging is “forbidden” (Indicator 6.2.3). Indicator 6.2.4 requires the firm to
control hunting and trade in illegal bushmeat, typically achieved through a system of armed
sentries, checkpoints, and barriers. Indicator 6.5.1 has implications for road-building: “for-
est management and its infrastructure shall avoid sensitive areas (valleys, river banks, steep
slopes)” and “the setting up of infrastructure needed for forest management shall be planned
in relation to site topography and resources location.” Similarly, Indicator 6.5.9 affects road-
building, specifying that “the transport network within the FMU shall be properly constructed
and maintained so as to avoid erosion and disturbance to natural drainage patterns.” FSC
certification has a social component as well, targeting employee safety and the health and
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well-being of people living within the FMU. For example, timber employees must be equipped
with personal, identifiable uniforms and equipment.
As these indicators suggest, implementing FSC’s forest management standards is costly
and takes time. Rainforest Alliance’s SmartStep program anticipates that it takes about five
years to move from no legality certification to FSC forest management certification. Forest
Stewardship Council’s management certification changes firm management of timber extrac-
tion processes in costly ways. Estimates from the FSC certified Kabo concession in Northern
Republic of Congo estimates that certifying a forest management unit incurs an initial cost
of 1,500 to 2000 FCFA/ha (about $3/ha ), and a recurring annual cost ranging from 355 to
1,000 FCFA/ha (Bank, 2007).
3.5 Congo Basin Forest Amenities: Conservation
Habitat protection for endemic and threatened species like the mountain gorilla, carbon se-
questration, rich plant, amphibian, bird, insect, and mammal biodiversity, and climate reg-
ulation services are just some examples of Congo Basin Forest environmental services. To
proxy for a forest management unit’s amenity potential, I use gorilla habitat and proximity
to a protected area.
The Congo Basin is home to all four gorilla species, all of which are listed by the World
Conservation Union’s Red List as “endangered” or “critically endangered.” I focus on gorilla
habitat as a marker of amenity value because gorillas are an endangered species and considered
a high conservation priority among policymakers, non-governmental organizations, scholars,
and the general public. Figure 14 depicts the area of occupancy for the Western Gorilla,
Gorilla gorilla, across Cameroon, Republic of Congo, and Gabon. A species’ area of occupancy
describes a species’ range. Areas not colored are unsuitable for gorilla habitat. As seen in the
map, gorilla habitat is patchy across space and includes a range of elevations. Gorillas prefer
secondary stands and clearings and avoid areas with human pressure. Recently, primatologists
identified swamp forests and mixed forests as key habitat for gorillas (Poulsen and Clark,
2004)(Melletti et al., 2009)(Rainey et al., 2010).
In addition to gorilla habitat suitability, I use a forest’s distance to the nearest protected
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area as a proxy for amenity value. Protected areas may harbor endemic flora and fauna, have
high species richness, or both. Protected areas in Gabon, Cameroon, and Congo are indicated
with hatch marks in Figure 13. Forests closer to protected areas may have higher biodiversity
potential than forests further away. Managing forests that surround protected areas improves
the resilience of protected area ecosystem services (Clark et al., 2009)(Poulsen and Clark, eds,
2010).
4 Theoretical Model
In this section, I model timber production under three regimes, uncertified, certified legal, and
certified managed. I use this model to make predictions as to the type of forest most likely to
certify as legal or managed. The model is most similar to Amacher et al. (2012), who model
incentives for firms to illegally log a forest concession.
I start with a model of uncertified timber production and then build in additional com-
pliance costs from legality and forest management certification. Firms choose a quantity of
timber, a management effort level, and voluntary policy participation status. Legality certifi-
cation enforces a legal maximum harvesting quantity and minimum effort level. Firms incur
an opportunity cost if the legal quantity maximum is smaller than the profit-maximizing
quantity. They may also incur a compliance cost from greater management effort. FSC for-
est management certification enforces these legal requirements and adds additional costs to
protect a forest’s biodiversity.
4.1 Uncertified Timber Production
I simplify the forest to be a stand of two species of trees, only one of which is sold for timber.
I assume the size of each tree, the proportion of commercial trees, and the number of trees
per hectare are identical for all forest management units. Forests vary only in biophysical
characteristics that affect the cost of timber harvest and in their amenity value. The biophys-
ical characteristics that affect production costs include a forest’s size, distance to a seaport,
weather pattern, and topography. These characteristics are summarized by the forest parame-
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ter β. The forest with the highest production costs has parameter β¯. A forest’s amenity value
is summarized by the forest parameter θ. Costs and amenity value may covary. A forest’s
costs and amenity value are known to the firm and auditor.4
In uncertified timber production, firms choose a quantity of timber q and management ef-
fort level l that maximizes their profit given production costs C(q, l) and an exogenous timber
price p. Timber harvesting costs are increasing and strictly convex in quantity for all types,
Cq(.) > 0, Cqq(.) > 0. Some management effort decreases harvesting costs Cl(q, 0) < 0, but
increasing management effort increases costs Cll(q, l) > 0. All forest types will choose some
positive amount of management effort, however high costs forests benefit more from manage-
ment, Clβ(.) < 0. For example, consider a forest with few dry days for timber harvesting.
Firms can spend management effort on rainy days to create a precise inventory and targeted
road network that improves their efficiency at accessing and felling commercial trees on dry
days. The firm extracts more trees per dry day which reduces the marginal harvesting cost
per tree. On the other hand, for a dry forest, management effort spent producing a precise in-
ventory takes resources away from harvesting activities, which are unconstrained by weather.5
I summarize the relationship between costs and forest type as C(q, l|β). Uncertified timber
profit-maximization is:
pi(q, l|β) = pq − C(q, l|β) (1)
Timber contracts specify a legal maximum allowable harvest limit, q¯ and a minimum effort
level l¯. I assume these requirements are unenforced for uncertified forests. Firms choose a
quantity q∗ and management effort level l∗ that maximize profit. Firms managing a low cost
forest will choose a management effort level less than the minimum legal requirement, l∗ < l¯.
High cost forests will choose an effort level of l∗ ≥ l¯.
4This eliminates strategic behavior between the firm and auditor. In this model, I am interested in under-
standing the threshold firm type that chooses to participate in certification.
5In Amacher et al. (2012), management effort includes environmentally sensitive management techniques.
These include longer routes, better road layout, and protection for residual trees, from longer time skidding
methods. In their model, these activities always increase harvesting costs, e.g. the cross partial derivative is
greater than zero for all forests, Cql(.) > 0, and firms never choose a positive amount of management unless
it is required. I broaden management effort to include the most primitive types of management, making
inventories, so that effort can improve firm targeting of commercial trees.
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4.2 Certified Legal Timber Production
Compliance with legality certification changes uncertified timber production costs in two ways.
First, external auditors enforce the maximum harvesting quantity and minimum management
effort level. Second, the firm must pay a fixed cost for auditors to monitor their compliance.
In return, the firm earns a small price premium γL. The profit expression becomes:
piLegal(q, l|β) = γLpq − C(q, l|β)− A (2)
Participation in legality certification is voluntary. Let {q∗, l∗} be the profit-maximizing quan-
tity and effort level when uncertified. Firms participate if it is rational to do so:
γLpq − C(q, l|β)− A > pq∗ − C(q∗, l∗|β) (3)
If we rearrange this expression, we can compare how participation changes revenues to how it
changes costs:
p(γLq − q∗) > C(q, l|β)− C(q∗, l∗|β) + A (4)
Equation (4) shows two types of participation costs: opportunity costs and compliance costs.
Opportunity costs are on the left; if the profit-maximizing quantity for basic timber production
exceeds the legal maximum, q∗ > q¯, the firm may incur an opportunity cost from participat-
ing. Compliance costs, on the right, depend on how quantity and management effort level
change with participation. All forests, regardless of type, incur fixed costs A. Compliance
costs unambiguously increase if the uncertified management effort was less than the legal re-
quirement. In the case where uncertified management effort exceeds the legal requirement,
compliance costs will increase if the uncertified quantity was less than the legal requirement.
This increase will be offset by new revenues on the righthand side.
Like in the case of uncertified timber production, amenity value θ does not directly factor
into the costs of production for certified legal timber production. It is only to the extent to
which the forest cost parameter β covaries with amenity value that we will see a relationship
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between amenity value and participation in legality certification.
4.3 Certified Responsibly Managed Timber Production (FSC)
Responsible forest management brings two additional requirements beyond legal timber certifi-
cation. First, mandatory management effort depends on forest characteristics and exceeds the
legal minimum, lF (β) > l¯. Second, firms must implement activities that address the amenity
value of their forest, incurring costs F (θ). In return, they earn a larger price premium γF .
The profit-maximization expression becomes:
piFSC(q, lF (β)|β) = γFpq − C(q, lF (β)|β)− A− F (θ) (5)
Like in the case of legality certification, the harvested quantity must not exceed the legal
maximum qF ≤ q¯. Now, management effort must satisfy l ≥ lFSC , where l¯ < lFSC . The
Individual Rationality condition comparing uncertified timber production to FSC-certified
production is:
γFpq − C(q, l|β)− A− F (θ) > pq∗ − C(q∗, l∗|β) (6)
Where q ≤ q¯ and l ≥ lFSC . Costs F (θ) reflect the fact that as amenity value increases, the
cost of implementing activities to safeguard this value also increases. If we rearrange terms,
we can better see a firm’s incentives to participate:
p(γF q − q∗) > C(q, l|β)− C(q∗, l∗|β) + A+ F (θ) (7)
Using this expression, we predict that forests with very high costs or very high amenity value
are less likely to participate in forest management certification. Forests with a high cost
parameter β will have a higher mandatory effort level, lF (β). For example, in addition to a
precise inventory and road plan, a forest with steep slopes may require special felling techniques
and additional infrastructure to prevent soil erosion.6 We would predict that forests with the
highest costs β¯ will be less likely to participate than forests with costs β < β¯. Forests with
6This management effort level is more similar to the management effort level described in Amacher et al.
(2012).
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high amenity value will have higher compliance costs F (θ). For example, a forest with a high
gorilla population will need to take additional measures to protect gorilla habitat and prevent
poaching. A forest with a low gorilla population will not incur these costs.
5 Data
I characterize production costs and amenity value for forest management units in three coun-
tries in the Congo Basin, Cameroon, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo, using publicly
available management and biophysical data. I processed geospatial data in order to create
proxies for forest production costs and forest amenity potential. I describe the details of the
data geoprocessing and each data source in the Data Appendix.
5.1 Forest Management Data
Management information spans from 1989 to 2009 and comes from the World Resources
Institute (WRI) Forest Atlases for Gabon, Cameroon, and the Republic of Congo. I dropped
forest management units that were never attributed to a firm throughout the period, leaving
194 forest management units that span 24.8 million hectares of forest. Table 24 breaks down
the population of forest management units by country and certification type. About half of
all forest management units are in Cameroon; Gabon and Congo each have about a quarter
of the total.
Figure 15 presents a histogram of active forest management units by year awarded. The
average year awarded is 2002; less than half of all FMUs were awarded before 2002 and about
one third of all FMUs were awarded after 2005. Forest management unit size varies greatly
among FMUs. The average size across FMUs is 141,000 ha with a standard deviation of
166,000 ha. The largest FMU, Danzer’s IFO concession in the Republic of Congo, is over 100
times the size of the smallest FMU, Rougier’s Lorema concession.
I used multiple sources to code legality and FSC forest management certification for the
period up until 2009. For legality certification, I focused on the four standards used in the
region: FSC’s Chain of Custody, Bureau Veritas’ OLB standard, SGS’s TLTV standard, and
117
Rainforest Alliance’s VLO and VLC standards. I updated the WRI Forest Atlas legality
certification status if I found evidence from one of these standards that the forest had been
legality certified during the period of inquiry. All FSC certified forests are legality certified.
In Table 24 we see that about one quarter of all FMUs have legality certification. Legality
certification appears less common in Congo, though this may reflect a bias in missing cer-
tification data.7 I also augmented WRI Forest Atlas data with certificate information from
Forest Stewardship Council’s Certificate Database.8. Returning to Table 24, we see that the
pattern of FSC Forest Management Certification reflects the general breakdown of FMUs by
country. More than half of all FSC certified FMUs are in Cameroon, with the remainder split
between Congo and Gabon.
5.2 Production Cost Proxies
In the theoretical model, I describe variation in forests as a function of biophysical features
that make harvesting more or less costly. I summarized these features in the forest parameter
β. I do not observe a forest’s harvesting costs. Instead, I proxy for harvesting costs related
to weather, terrain, and location using observable biophysical characteristics.
To proxy for costs related to weather, such as harvest season length or depreciation of
roads or machines, I use a forest’s average annual rainfall. Most of the Congo Basin is humid
tropical forest and very rainy. We see in Table 25 that the average annual precipitation is 1,740
cm and the standard deviation is about 295 cm. I calculated a forest’s average annual rainfall
by summing monthly rainfall for each pixel across twelve months, then taking the average
across all pixels within the FMU. To capture variation in a forest’s terrain, I calculated the
average slope, in degrees, within a forest management unit. The average slope is 1.2 degrees
with a standard deviation of 0.77 degrees. To proxy for a forest’s transportation costs, I use
the Euclidean distance to the nearest seaport. The furthest forest is over 460 km from the
closest seaport, while the average distance is 177 km, with a standard deviation of 98 km.
7Legality certification coding suffers from three weakness. First, not all labels publish forest management
unit identities. Second, it is not clear how consistently each standard body updates their information. Finally,
the WRI Version 1 Forest Atlas for the Republic of Congo did not publish legality certification status.
8http://info.fsc.org/ Accessed February 2011
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5.3 Forest Amenity Value Proxies
Ecologists do not agree on the best way to quantify the manifold of ecosystem services provided
by Congo Basin forests. Lacking a measurement for general amenity potential, I focus on two
types of proxies for measuring an FMU’s amenity potential: gorilla habitat suitability and
distance to a protected area.
I calculate two measures of gorilla habitat suitability using data from IEA. First, I cal-
culated the percentage of the FMU’s total area that is at least somewhat suitable for gorilla
habitat. A pixel’s dimensions are one meter by one meter. We see in Table 25 that on average
16% of forest area is highly suitable for gorillas, with a standard deviation of 21%. One forest
is almost entirely highly suitable for gorillas: 92%. Next, I create a dummy variable equal
to one if there is at least one pixel of “highly suitable” gorilla habitat within the forest man-
agement unit. About three-quarters of all FMUs have at least one meter squared of highly
suitable gorilla habitat.
For distance to the nearest protected area, I calculated the forest’s Euclidean distance
to the border of the nearest protected area using polygons of protected areas in Cameroon,
Congo, and Gabon. The average is about 11 km, as reported in Table 25, and the standard
deviation 13 km. The maximum distance is 62 km away and the minimum is adjacent to a
protected area.
6 Empirical Strategy
The goal of the empirical analysis is to predict the drivers of participation in legality and
FSC forest management certification. This section begins by introducing and justifying my
preferred specification, a probit regression with robust standard errors. From the theoretical
model, I predict that participation in legality and forest management certification depends on
forest type and amenity value, which I do not observe. Instead, I use proxies for forest type
to investigate whether this prediction holds empirically.
Forest type is summarized by the vector β, which includes a forest’s weather, terrain, size
and location, among other factors that may affect production costs. Empirically, I proxy for β
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using average rainfall Raini, average slope Slopei, and distance to seaport DistPorti. Fixed
costs, such as auditing expenses, are proxied by forest Sizei. I also control for unobserved
characteristics common across a country using Countryi the length of time since the forest
was awarded via Agei. Finally, I proxy for amenity value using two measures of gorilla habitat
GorHabitati and the forest’s distance to a protected area.
6.1 Regression Specification: Latent Variable Approach
I model the decision to participate in legality or forest management certification using a latent
variable approach. I assume the unobserved error component is normally distributed and test
hypotheses regarding participation drivers using a probit regression.
A firm managing a forest has a binary choice, whether or not to certify their FMU. The
participation decision reflects a threshold for an unobserved latent random variable w, where
firms choose to certify if w > 0. The latent random variable w reflects the individual rationality
constraint, reported in Equation (4) for legality and Equation (7) for FSC forest management
certification. Focusing on forest management certification, the critical value for the latent
random variable is:
w = f(β) +  (8)
w = f(Slopei, DistPorti, Raini, Sizei, GorHabitati, Countryi, Agei) +  (9)
If I assume that these terms enter linearly and the unobserved error term is normally
distributed,  N(0, σ2), I can estimate this using a probit regression. The likelihood that a
forest participates in legality certification is then:
Pr(χ = 1) = Pr(w > 0)
= Φ(Slopei +DistPorti +Raini + Sizei +GorHabitati + Countryi + Agei)
In practice, I allow for general heteroskedasticity of the error term by using a probit regression
with robust (sandwich) standard errors.
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The cost proxies for forest type β are derived as summary statistics using a forest’s polygon.
We find great variation across forest management units in size; thus the population for each
summary statistic varies across forests, introducing heteroskedasticity in the error term. I
address variation in forest size by including estimates that use the natural log of each cost
proxy.
7 Results
I investigate drivers of participation in legality and FSC forest management certification for
194 Forest Management Units (FMUs) from three countries, Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon,
over the period of 1987 to 2009. I test the theoretical model’s prediction that forests with lower
compliance costs or lower opportunity costs are more likely to participate in either legality or
FSC forest management certification. I then investigate whether forests with higher amenity
potential are less likely to become legality or FSC forest management certified. To test these
hypotheses, I use a probit regression with robust standard errors. Results tables 26, 27, and
28 report the sample mean of the estimated derivative.
7.1 Predicting Participation in Legality Certification
From the theoretical model, we predict that forests with low participation costs are more
likely to participate in legality certification. Forests with high ex ante production costs are
more likely to have low compliance and opportunity costs. Amenity value should not deter or
encourage participation in legality certification directly. This section characterizes how proxies
for high production costs and amenity value predict participation in legality certification in
Table 26. For each regression specification, the outcome variable is a dummy variable equal
to one if the forest management unit was ever legality certified before 2009.
I use a forest’s observable biophysical features as proxies for high ex ante production costs.
These biophysical features include average annual precipitation, average slope of forest terrain,
distance to seaport, and forest size. For rainy or steeply sloped forests, management effort
spent on improved inventories and road-planning reduces harvesting costs. For these forests,
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compliance with legality certification requires minimal additional management effort and is
less costly. In Table 26 we see that average annual rainfall across the FMU, measured in
100 centimeters, predicts participation in legality certification. Forest management units with
higher precipitation are more likely to participate. An additional 100 centimeters of rain per
year increases the likelihood of participating in legality certification by between 2-3 percentage
points. Increasing annual precipitation by one standard deviation increases the likelihood of
legality certification by 6-9%. Steeper average slope also predicts legality participation. The
magnitude of the increase is similar to that of precipitation: an increase of one standard
deviation, 0.7 degrees, increases the likelihood of participating by 5%.
FMUs with a low opportunity cost from the enforced legal maximum are more likely to
participate in legality certification. Recall that opportunity costs are the difference between
uncertified and certified revenues, pq∗ − γLpqL, where certified volume must not exceed the
legal maximum qL ≤ q¯. Firms with ex ante lower quantity q∗ will have lower opportunity
costs from participating in legality certification, where the harvesting maximum is enforced.
High transport costs make it more likley that a forest has lower profit-maximizing uncertified
quantity. I use the forest management unit’s distance to a seaport as a proxy for transportation
costs. We see in Table 26 that moving an additional 10 km away increases the likelihood of
participating by about 1.5%.
Legality certification costs do not vary with a forest’s amenity value. I proxy amenity
value using gorilla habitat suitability or a forest’s distance to a protected area. If amenity
value predicts participation, it must be through correlation with unobserved forest character-
istics that make legality certification profitable. I find that forests with habitat suitable for
gorillas are more likely to participate, however proximity to a protected area does not predict
participation. The greater the proportion of the forest highly suitable for gorilla habitat, the
more likely the firm participates in legality certification. Increasing the proportion of forest
highly suitable for gorilla habitat by one standard deviation increases the likelihood of legal-
ity certification by 8%. Moving from no highly suitable gorilla habitat to at least one meter
squared increases the likelihood of legality certification by 16 percentage points. In contrast,
the distance to the nearest protected area has no effect.
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Legality certification does not address gorilla conservation directly. Why then are forests
with highly suitable gorilla habitat more likely to participate? Two different explanations
could explain the relationship. Perhaps gorilla habitat suitability is correlated with an unob-
served forest characteristic that also affects compliance or opportunity costs of participation.
For example, gorillas are highly sensitive to human pressure and prefer areas with low hu-
man settlement density. Lower human population density implies fewer skilled workers, less
infrastructure such as major roads, electricity, or cell phone coverage, and higher input costs
such as gasoline and agricultural goods to feed workers, all of which imply higher ex ante
production costs. Or perhaps forests with highly suitable gorilla habitat experience pressure
from conservation non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who object to timber production
in high amenity value forests. If NGOs use campaigns to shift timber demand away from
these forests, firms may opt to certify that their timber is legal to recapture timber demand
from environmentally sensitive customers.
7.2 Predicting Participation in FSC Forest Management Certifica-
tion
Like in the case of legality certification, we expect forests with lower participation costs to
be more likely to participate in FSC forest management certification. The FSC forest man-
agement includes the same requirements as legality certification, but requires additional man-
agement effort and protection of forest amenity value. In return, firms earn a higher price
premium from FSC certification. These differences from the legality case change our predic-
tions in three ways. First, larger fixed costs from FSC participation implies that larger forests
will be more likely to participate. Second, a large price premium and management effort tied
to forest type make lower cost forests more likely to participate than in the case of legality
certification. Third, we expect forests with higher amenity value to have higher compliance
costs and be less likely to become FSC certified.
Table 27 reports the likelihood of participating in FSC forest management certification.
For each specification, the outcome variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the forest
management unit was ever FSC forest management certified before 2009. Covariates are
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identical to the previous table for legality certification. FSC forest management standard’s
higher fixed costs imply that larger forests are more likely to participate. Size does appear
to be a strong predictor of FSC forest management certification, however the magnitude is
smaller than in the case of legality certification. For FSC, increasing forest size by one standard
deviation increases the likelihood of certification by 4.5%.
Two features of FSC forest management certification make it more likely that forests
with ex ante low production costs forests may be more likely to participate than in the case
of legality certification. First, we expect compliance costs related to management effort to
increase for forests with high production cost characteristics. For example, a forest with steep
slopes will have a higher management effort requirement than a flat forest. Because of this, we
expect forests with the highest production cost characteristics to be less likely to participate
in FSC. Second, a higher price premium for FSC-certified timber provides a greater offset for
lost revenues from enforcing the harvest maximum. For both standards, production quantity
may not exceed the legal maximum qL, qF ≤ q¯. A firm’s opportunity costs, pq∗ − γFpqF , are
always higher for forests with higher uncertified quantity, q∗. However, a higher price premium
will enable greater participation by forests with low production costs as compared to legality
certification.
We can compare estimates for FSC participation drivers in Table 27 to legality partici-
pation drivers to see if these predictions hold for production cost proxies. Precipitation is a
reliable driver of participation in either policy; the magnitude of the estimate is about the
same for both legality and FSC certification. This makes sense because precipitation begets
few additional management activities. For FSC participation, slope of forest terrain no longer
predicts participation and the magnitude of the estimate is zero, compared to 6 percentage
points in the case of legality certification. This may reflect very sloped forests choosing not
to pursue FSC certification due to additional compliance costs from increased management
effort. Like in the case of legality certification, forests further from the seaport are more likely
to participate in FSC. However, the relationship is weaker and the magnitude is only a quarter
of that for legality certification. This fits with our intuition that a higher price premium will
enable forests with lower transportation costs to participate.
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For FSC forest management certification, having high amenity value poses a liability for
the forest. Higher amenity value brings greater compliance costs, as firms must biodiversity
needs. In Table 26, we found a correlation between gorilla habitat suitability and likelihood to
participate in legality certification. We speculated that either gorilla habitat is correlated with
an unobserved driver of participation in legality certification or that pressure from conservation
non-governmental organizations pushes firms to participate.
In the case of FSC forest management certification, the presence of gorillas brings addi-
tional costs through monitoring and protection measures. Having gorilla populations within
an FMU increases the cost of FSC compliance and may discourage participation. Across
all specifications of Table 27, I do not find direct evidence that forests with suitable gorilla
habitat are less likely to participate in FSC. The coefficients for percentage of FMU highly
suitable for gorillas and a dummy for any suitable gorilla habitat are both near zero but pos-
itive, a pattern repeated for the distance to a protected area measure. However, given that
gorilla habitat suitability was correlated with profitable legality certification, the elimination
of this correlation may indicate that forests with suitable gorilla habitat are opting out of
FSC certification.
7.3 Alternative Specification
In this section, I continue to use a probit regression specification with robust standard errors.
I focus on one amenity value measure, the percentage FMU with highly suitable gorilla habitat
measure for amenity value. Because forests vary greatly in size, I present results using the
natural log of the suite of production cost proxies in Table 28. I start by discussing changes
in the direction of predictions then compare their magnitudes and significance.
For legality certification, the direction of participation drivers, cost proxies and amenity
value, remains the same as in the main specification. For FSC certification, two estimates
change sign: forest slope and the percentage of the forest highly suitable for gorillas. The
gorilla estimate remains nearly zero, however the slope estimate magnitude is fairly large.
Neither estimate is significant.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigated the drivers of participation in two voluntary forest policies,
legality certification and Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) forest management certification.
Because both policies are voluntary, firms only participate if it is profitable to do so. I use this
relationship and a model of how each policy changes costs and revenues to investigate drivers
of participation in legality and FSC forest management certification for 194 forest management
units in Gabon, Cameroon, and the Republic of Congo. Voluntary policy participation costs
vary with a forest’s ex ante production costs and amenity value. I use biophysical forest
characteristics as a proxy for ex ante production costs and test whether forests with lower
participation costs are more likely to participate in either voluntary policy.
For legality certification, firms must respect the legal harvest maximum and management
level minimum. In return, they earn a small price premium. Two predictions emerge from
the theoretical model. First, we expect forests with lower opportunity costs to be more likely
to participate in legality certification. Opportunity costs refer to foregone revenues from
respecting the legal harvesting maximum. Forests with higher ex ante production costs are
less likely to incur opportunity costs. Second, we expect firms with lower compliance costs
to be more likely to participate. Compliance costs come from increasing management effort
to the legal minimum. Forests with higher ex ante production costs may also have higher ex
ante management effort, thus lower compliance costs.
Based on these two predictions, we expect forests with cost proxies that indicate higher
production costs to be more likely to participate in legality certification. Consistent with
the model, I find that higher annual precipitation, greater average slope of forest terrain,
and greater distance to seaport predict participation in legality certification. I also find that
gorilla habitat suitability strongly predicts participation in legality certification, despite the
fact that legality certification does not address biodiversity protection directly. I suggest that
this relationship may be due to correlation between gorillas and low human population density,
which increases production costs, or from firms responding to pressure from conservation non-
governmental organizations.
FSC forest management certification, brings two additional requirements beyond legality
126
certification. Management effort is no longer capped at the legal requirement and instead
reflects forest characteristics. Forests with higher production costs will have higher manage-
ment effort requirements and thus higher compliance costs. Similarly, firms must protect forest
amenity value. Forests with higher amenity value, such as those suitable for gorillas, will have
higher compliance costs. These requirements make participation less likely for forests with
high production costs or high amenity value. Unlike in the legality case, forests with very
sloped terrain or far from the seaport are not more likely to participate in FSC certification.
Likewise, forests suitable for gorillas are not more likely to participate in FSC. These pat-
terns could reflect additional compliance costs associated with forest management and gorilla
conservation, which is not the case for legality certification.
These participation drivers have implications for each standard’s overall effectiveness. I
find that firms with high ex ante production costs are more likely to participate in legality
certification. The goal of legality certification is to reduce illegal logging. These forests may
be less likely to overexploit as compared to forests with low production costs, limiting the
reduction in illegal logging caused by the policy. For FSC forest management certification, I
find that forests with high amenity value are not less likely to participate than the average
forest. FSC forest management certification may fail to target conservation of forests with
the highest biodiversity value but I do not find evidence of adverse selection.
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Table 27: Certification Frequency by Country
Country
Participation Status Cameroon Gabon Congo Total
No. No. No. No.
Basic 68 35 46 149
Certified Legal 17 8 0 25
Certified FSC 12 5 3 20
Total 97 48 49 194
Table 28: Summary Statistics
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max.
Annual rainfall (100cm) 17.39 (2.947) 12.013 28.005
Average Slope (degrees) 1.199 (0.766) 0.235 4.616
Distance Port (10km) 17.703 (9.833) 1.628 46.079
Size (10,000ha) 14.1 (16.578) 1.033 142.289
Highly Suitable Gorilla (%) 0.163 (0.206) 0 0.923
Highly Suitable for Gorilla (dummy) 0.773 (0.42) 0 1
Min Distance Protected Area (km) 10.789 (13.494) 0 62.201
N 194
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Table 29: Participation Drivers for Legality Certification
(1) (2) (3)
Legality Legality Legality
Annual rainfall (100cm) 0.0238* 0.0320** 0.0326**
(0.0104) (0.0114) (0.0122)
Slope of Terrain (degree) 0.0634 0.0688* 0.0613
(0.0340) (0.0344) (0.0360)
Distance Port (10km) 0.0148*** 0.0149*** 0.0171***
(0.00310) (0.00310) (0.00350)
FMU Size (10,000ha) 0.00366* 0.00268 0.00343
(0.00174) (0.00176) (0.00191)
% FMU Highly Suitable Gorilla 0.431**
(0.144)
Highly Suitable for Gorillas 0.162**
(0.0524)
Distance Protected Area (km) 0.000929
(0.00204)
Observations 194 194 194
Probit regression with robust standard errors. Marginal effects reported.
Regression includes country and concession age dummies (not reported).
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 30: Participation Drivers for Forest Management Certification
(1) (2) (3)
FSC FSC FSC
Annual rainfall (100cm) 0.0235** 0.0249** 0.0256**
(0.00842) (0.00887) (0.00884)
Slope of Terrain (degree) 0.000408 0.00512 -0.0000304
(0.0266) (0.0261) (0.0266)
Distance Port (10km) 0.00341 0.00340 0.00367*
(0.00183) (0.00180) (0.00184)
FMU Size (10,000ha) 0.00277** 0.00271** 0.00285**
(0.000997) (0.001000) (0.00101)
% FMU Highly Suitable Gorilla 0.0103
(0.0911)
Highly Suitable for Gorillas 0.0467
(0.0414)
Distance Protected Area (km) 0.00112
(0.00143)
Observations 194 194 194
Probit regression with robust standard errors. Marginal effects reported.
Regression includes country and concession age dummies (not reported).
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 31: Alternative Specification (Logs)
(1) (2)
Legality FSC
Log Annual rainfall (100cm) 0.758** 0.777**
(0.249) (0.254)
Log Slope of Terrain (degree) 0.0702 -0.0424
(0.0541) (0.0431)
Log Distance Port (10km) 0.276*** 0.124*
(0.0576) (0.0525)
Log FMU Size (10,000ha) 0.0690 0.0619*
(0.0444) (0.0293)
% FMU Highly Suitable Gorilla 0.370** -0.0225
(0.131) (0.108)
Observations 194 194
Probit regression with robust standard errors. Marginal effects reported.
Regression includes country and concession age dummies (not reported).
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 32: Data Sources
Data Type Source Scale
Country boundaries World Resources Institute's ROC Forest Atlas, Version 1
Rivers & Lakes Digital Chart of the world 1:1,000,000 map
Towns Columbia University's Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center, Gridded Rural-Urban Mapping Project, version alpha ~ 90 m resolution
Soils ESRI digitized FAO-UNESCO's Soil Map of the World 1:5,000,000 map
Precipitation WorldClim database, Version 4 (release 3). See Hijmans et al. (2005) for details. ~ 90 m resolution
Elevation NASA Shuttle Radar Topographic Mission's (SRTM) Digital Elevation Model, Version 4 ~ 90 m resolution
Ports EGY Shipping's World Port Codes
Gorilla Area of Occupancy Institute of Applied Ecology's (IEA) African Mammals Databank ~ 90 m resolution
Priority Landscape Boundaries Central Africa Regional Program on the Environment, USAID
FMU and Protected Area 
boundaries, Cameroon World Resources Institute's Cameroon Forest Atlas, Version 2
FMU and Protected Area 
boundaries, Republic of Congo World Resources Institute's ROC Forest Atlas, Version 1
FMU and Protected Area 
boundaries, Gabon World Resources Institute's Gabon Forest Atlas, Version 1
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Figure 13: Forest Management Units in Cameroon, Gabon and Congo
135
Figure 14: Western Gorilla Gorilla gorilla habitat in study area
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Figure 15: Histogram of Forest Management Unit Initial Allocation Year
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Data Appendix
Table 29 describes the geospatial data, source, and scale used in the empirical analysis. All
geospatial data were processed using ArcGIS version 9.3’s scripting module, arcgisscripting,
and Python version 2.5. For the digital elevation model data, the panels covering the five
country region were downloaded from the Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research’s website (CGIAR) and knitted together before processing. The following describes
how data were prepared for the econometric analysis:
• Data were transformed into WGS-84 datum and projected using the Mercator projection
• Boundaries clipped to the boundaries of the five Congo Basin countries (Cameroon, Cen-
tral African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Gabon)
• Vector data was rasterized to cell size of 1 km and raster data was resampled to cell size
1 km
• FMU and Protected Area boundaries were used as inputs for the zonal statistics tool
from the Spatial Analyst toolbox to calculate mean, min, max, range, and variety of
pixel values for each zone
Additional processing was necessary for some datasets. To calculate the slope of each 1
km cell across the three countries, I used the slope tool in ArcGIS’s Spatial Analyst toolbox’s
Surface kit to process elevation data derived from 90m NASA’s SRTM. For each 1 km square,
the slope tool measures in degrees, ζ, where tan(ζ) = rise/run, by taking the maximum
rise/run from the eight neighboring cells.9 Note that the slope does not include information
on aspect (the direction the slope is pointing).
Aspect is captured in the wetness index, which is derived using a two step process. First, I
calculated a grid that predicted water flow direction. Flow direction is calculated by comparing
the slope of adjacent cells and determining which has the steepest descent.10 Using flow
9More precisely, using map algebra the tool finds slope as ζ = arctan ((dz/dx)2 + (dz/dy)2) * 57.29578,
where the coefficient converts from radians to degrees
10“Flow Direction” finds the change in the z-value/distance, where distance between two orthogonal cells is
1 km and between two diagonal cells is 1.414
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direction, I then calculated another raster for water flow accumulation, what I call the wetness
index. For each 1 km square, flow accumulation recursively counts the number of upslope cells
and each upslope cell counts as 1.11 Higher values indicate a greater propensity to be wet.
I summarized this data for all cells in an FMU zone using measures meaningful for timber
costs, such as the average. For regressions, then normalized the mean wetness variable (205
observations, one for each FMU) to create an easier to interpret wetness index with mean 0
and standard deviation of 1.
Population data comes from two sources, both produced by the Center for International
Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) of the Earth Institute at Columbia University.
CIESIN produces the Gridded Population of the World, version 3 (GPWv3), and the geo-
referenced Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP) dataset of point settlements and
their estimated population. I used the gridded population for the measure of max population
in one square kilometer within an FMU. However, for selecting towns of greater than 100,000
people, I used the settlement dataset’s population estimate for the year 2000. This dataset is
an amalgamation of diverse population data sources, each with varying reliability. I also used
the settlement dataset to define seaports. Because I was unable to locate a publicly available
dataset that included georeferenced seaports, I coded settlements from CIESIN’s data using
SGY shipping’s port locator reference to include a dummy for whether or not the town was a
seaport.
To calculate the distance of an FMU to the seaport, I would have preferred to calculate
the distance by road. However, I lack a complete road network and thus was forced to use
Euclidean distance. Euclidean distance is measured by creating a right triangle on an x-y
plane, where the centroid of the source and origin cells act as the acute angle vertices. The
distance of the hypotenuse of this triangle is recorded as the Euclidean distance between the
two points.12 I used the same process to find FMU distance to the nearest protected area and
to large towns.
11Upslope is defined as having a Flow Direction value greater than that cells own value
12Elevation data is not included in the analysis, so the actual Euclidean distances may be longer.
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